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OPENING ADDRESS 
Brendan Whelan 
 
 
WELCOME 
On behalf of the co-hosts, the Economic and Social Research 
Institute and the Foundation for Fiscal Studies, I would like to wish 
you all a warm welcome to this year’s Budget Perspectives Conference.    
These conferences have proved to be a very useful venue in which 
the context surrounding the budget can be analysed and debated, 
and the excellent attendance today is testimony to their on-going 
relevance. As usual, I should begin by reminding everyone that the 
views expressed are strictly those of the individual authors; neither 
the ESRI nor the FFS takes corporate or institutional positions in 
relation to any of the issues raised. 
 
 While it might not seem so to the Minister, or to those helping 
him to frame the budget, the overall economic and fiscal situation 
provides more flexibility than has been the case for many previous 
budgets. As our first presentation, from Alan Barrett the editor of 
the ESRI’s Quarterly Economic Commentary, will show the immediate 
prospects for the Irish economy appear to be quite positive. Growth 
in both 2005 and 2006 is projected to be close to the long-run 
potential rate of about 5 per cent, recent data indicate that 
expansion in employment has been strong and tax revenues are 
buoyant. There are, of course, some threats and uncertainties, 
including the global imbalances in the world economy, the 
possibility that the unusually strong performance of the Irish 
construction sector might suffer a set-back and the volatility of oil 
prices. However, on the whole the immediate future seems quite 
favourable. It is appropriate, therefore, that our conference this year 
should focus on a range of relatively long-term issues, factors 
which, if given policy attention now, will yield returns for many 
years to come.  
The Overall 
Economic 
Situation
LONG-RUN PRESSURES ON THE PUBLIC FINANCES  
1 
Our second presentation, by Alan Barrett and Adele Bergin, 
quantifies the effects which Ireland’s ageing population will have on 
the public finances. While less dramatic and immediate than the 
threats posed in other countries, these pressures are very real and 
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should be taken into account in designing current policy. Alan and 
Adele provide a detailed timeline illustrating the pattern of future 
vulnerabilities and discuss how policy instruments such as the 
National Pension Reserve Fund can best be utilised.  
 
 Our distinguished international speaker this year is John McHale, 
an Irishman now based in Queen’s University Canada.  John takes a 
keen interest in developments in Ireland and is a frequent and 
insightful commentator on the Irish economy. His paper uses some 
insights from the burgeoning field of behavioural economics to 
make policy suggestions, applicable to Ireland’s situation, about how 
private saving for retirement could be significantly increased so 
reducing the burden on the public finances. 
Retirement 
Saving
 
 In the third presentation, Tim Callan, John Walsh and Kieran 
Coleman focus on a key aspect of the overall taxation system: the 
extent to which it is desirable utilise “tax expenditures” in the sense 
of tax foregone through the use of reliefs and allowances to fund 
desired economic and social objectives. They draw on international 
experience and put Ireland in comparative context. They conclude 
that it is very important for both policymakers and taxpayers to be 
aware that tax concessions have real costs, so that the tests required 
for direct expenditures are equally required for tax expenditures.  
Tax Expenditures 
 
 In the final presentation, Edgar Morgenroth will review the debate 
about user charges for refuse collection in the light of the economic 
literature on incentives in local service provision. He argues in 
favour of basing the charge on the level of service, such as on the 
basis of weight or volume of refuse, and presents evidence that the 
efficiency of waste collection in Ireland has improved as a result of 
greater private sector involvement. 
User Charges for 
Waste Collection
 
 We have tried to plan the morning so that there will be time for a 
short period of discussion after each paper as well as a general panel 
session at the end. I hope that the now well established tradition of 
lively participation in these exchanges will continue. 
Final Comment
 
ASSESSING AGE-
RELATED PRESSURES ON 
THE PUBLIC FINANCES, 
2005 TO 2050 
Alan Barrett and Adele Bergin*
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the pressures that will be 
put on the public finances over the next half century as a result of 
population ageing. While this is an issue that has been addressed in a 
number of studies, this study makes a useful addition to the 
literature for the following reasons.  
1. 
Introduction
• First, many of the studies have looked at individual 
components of the public finances, such as social welfare or 
long-term care, but have not considered aggregate impacts 
on variables such as the Exchequer deficit and the national 
debt. Examples of such studies include Department of 
Social and Family Affairs (2002a) and (2002b).  
• Second, the one study that has taken an aggregate view 
(Department of Finance, 1998) was based on population 
projections that are somewhat outdated. Here, we consider 
both individual components of the public finances and the 
aggregate picture, using population projections based on the 
Census 2002. As improvements in life expectancy between 
1996 and 2002 exceeded previous projected levels (CSO, 
2004), it is important that these be captured in new 
projections. 
• Third, the Department of Finance (1998) study was written 
before the introduction of the National Pension Reserve 
Fund. It is now important that its potential role be assessed 
in easing age-related fiscal pressures. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the 
literature in this area, especially as it relates to Ireland. In Section 3, 
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we present the baseline population projections that underpin our 
public finance projections. We also outline the assumptions that are 
used in projecting GNP out to 2050. In Section 4, we turn to the 
public finance projections. We begin by setting out the projected 
values for the various components that are most likely to be affected 
by population ageing – these are social welfare, health and education. 
We then bring the various components together to assess the overall 
impact of population ageing on the public finances. In Section 5, we 
alter some of the assumptions underlying the population projections 
and consider the impacts on the public finance projections. In 
Section 6 we conclude with some policy-related observations. 
 
 Department of Finance (1998) presents possible long-term trends 
in the public finances out to 2056. The report includes a number of 
scenarios, all of which point to long-term pressures on the public 
finances as a result of population ageing. In the baseline scenario, 
the government is assumed to operate budget surpluses out to 2032 
whereby the national debt becomes a national surplus (reaching 14 
per cent of GNP in 2030). This leaves the Exchequer well placed to 
deal with the acceleration in the ageing of the population in the 
2030s and 2040s although the Exchequer deficit does reach 2.3 per 
cent of GNP by 2050. 
2. 
Literature
A number of alternative scenarios are presented. In one such 
scenario debt is held constant at 36 per cent of GNP from 2005 to 
2020. In this case annual deficits rise to 12.9 per cent of GNP by 
2050 and debt increases to 168 per cent of GNP in the same year. In 
another scenario, economic growth is assumed to be 1 per cent 
lower each year than in the baseline. This leads to a projected deficit 
of 36.1 per cent of GNP in 2050 and a debt level of 455 per cent. 
This report was followed by another (Department of Finance, 
1999) which recommended the setting up of the National Pension 
Reserve Fund (NPRF) as a way of partly pre-funding public pensions 
(public service and social insurance/assistance). According to 
calculations presented in this report, if the Fund was relied upon to 
bridge the gap between receipts and age-related spending, it would 
be exhausted by 2056 thereby creating a large funding gap in that 
year. Hence the Fund is only part of the solution and in our analysis 
below we consider what role it can play. 
Other studies of long-term fiscal pressures in Ireland have 
looked at components of the public finances rather than the 
aggregate situation. Projections for Ireland included in Economic 
Policy Committee (2001) show spending on public service and social 
welfare pensions combined rising from 4.6 per cent of GNP in 2000 
to 9 per cent in 2050. The projected increase of 4.4 percentage 
points is higher than that for the EU-15 average (3.2 per cent1). This 
can be partly explained by the fact that for many EU countries 
population ageing was already affecting spending on pensions in 
 
1 For all countries other than Ireland, spending is expressed as a share of GDP. 
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2000. Average spending for the EU stood at 10.4 per cent of GNP 
in 2000, partly because of more generous benefits but also because 
of population structure. That same report also contained projections 
on spending for health and long-term care combined. The result for 
Ireland was similar to the EU average – an increase of 2.5 
percentage points of GNP between 2000 and 2050 in Ireland and a 
EU average of 2.7 percentage points. 
One other point that is worth noting from EPC (2001) is that 
public pension spending across the EU is expected to peak, on 
average, in 2040. In Ireland’s case, the projected value was at the end 
of the projection period and so we do not know when the peak will 
occur. The different pattern relates to the earlier onset of population 
ageing elsewhere. In the case of France, public pension spending 
was 12.1 per cent of GDP in 2000 and was projected to rise to 16 
per cent in 2030. By 2040, this was projected to fall to 15.8 per cent. 
Italy shows a similar projected pattern, with public pension spending 
rising from 13.8 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 15.7 per cent in 2030. 
This largest projected increase is in the case of Greece, with 
spending projected to rise from 12.1 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 
24.8 per cent in 2050. 
Analyses of the age-related fiscal issues arise in the context of the 
periodic actuarial review of the Social Insurance Fund. The most 
recent review (Department of Social and Family Affairs, 2002a) 
captured the age-related fiscal pressures by estimating the required 
increases in contribution rates that would be needed to keep the 
Fund in balance. Assuming payments are indexed to earnings, it is 
estimated that contribution rates would have to be 240 per cent of 
current rates in 2056 to achieve a balance between expenditure and 
receipts. The report goes on to consider a situation in which 
payments are raised at the outset of the projection period so that the 
lowest benefit is equal to 27 per cent of average industrial earnings. 
This results in a contribution rate in 2056 that is 276 per cent of 
current rates if balance is to be achieved. This points to the 
importance of considering long-term cost implications of short-term 
policy changes. The report also includes an analysis of the situation 
in which payments are indexed to prices as opposed to earnings. 
This results in contribution rates in 2056 that are lower than today’s 
rates but this, of course, is achieved at substantially devalued 
benefits rates.2
A final study of relevance is of the long-term cost of long-term 
care for the elderly (Department of Social and Family Affairs, 
2002b). This report estimates that the cost of current state provision 
of long-term care could rise from €513 million in 2001 to €4.2 
billion in 2051 (in real terms).  
 
 
2 The indexing of pension payments to prices as opposed to earnings has been 
adopted in the UK and has resulted in projections of pensions spending showing 
lower spending in 2050 relative to today. In EPC (2001), UK public spending on 
pensions is projected to fall from 5.5 per cent of GNP in 2000 to 4.4 per cent in 
2050. 
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 The population projections are generated in the following way. 
Beginning with the baseline year of 2002 (the year of the most recent 
Census), we impose assumptions on fertility, mortality and migration 
to produce projected numbers of males and females in each yearly 
age cohort out to 2050. In making assumptions, we have decided to 
follow closely the CSO partly to ensure some degree of 
comparability with other published results (CSO, 2004).  
3. 
Population and 
GNP 
Projections
With regard to fertility, we assume that the total fertility rate 
decreases to 1.85 by 2011 and remains constant thereafter. For 
mortality, we assume that the rate of improvement observed 
between 1986 and 2002 is maintained out to 2036; from then on the 
rate of improvement is halved.3 This implies a life expectancy of 
83.7 years for men in 2050 and 88 years for women. On migration, 
we assume that net inflows will be 30,000 in 2005 and 2006, 20,000 
on average annually between 2006 and 2010, 10,000 on average 
annually between 2011 and 2015 and 5,000 annually thereafter. 
The headline results from the projections are shown in Table 1. 
Looking firstly at the total population, it is projected to increase 
from 4.1 million in 2005 to 5.2 million in 2050, an increase of 28 per 
cent. For the purposes of this paper, what is of greater interest is the 
change in the structure of the population. In 2005, 11 per cent of the 
population is aged 65 and over. This proportion increases gradually 
to 12 per cent by 2010 but then grows more rapidly, rising to 29 per 
cent of the population by 2050. Hence, the ageing of the population 
is readily observable. An alternative view of this can be taken by 
looking at the relative sizes of the old-age and working-age4 
populations, i.e. the old-age dependency ratio. This increases from 
16.4 per cent to 51.5 per cent.  
Table 1: Population Structure 2005-2050 
Age 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
0-14 years 856,900 923,979 954,022 847,107 829,230 838,852 
15-64 years 2,789,249 2,949,469 3,103,383 3,195,614 3,113,398 2,903,635 
65+ years 456,213 508,750 705,058 948,419 1,223,508 1,496,073 
Total 4,102,362 4,382,197 4,762,462 4,991,140 5,166,136 5,238,561 
 % % % % % % 
0-14 years 21 21 20 17 16 16 
15-64 years 68 67 65 64 60 55 
65+ years 11 12 15 19 24 29 
       
Old-age DR 16.4 17.2 22.7 29.7 39.3 51.5 
 
 
3 There is one exception to this assumption – for 20-29 year olds, the improvement 
in mortality between 1996 and 2002 is used. 
4 We define “working age” to be 15-64 years although our GNP projections below 
do factor in people over the age of 65 who are still working. 
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In Figure 1, we provide a graphical representation of how the 
percentages of the population age 65 years and over and between 15 
and 64 years will evolve out to 2050. The pattern is clear and the 
reason for age-related fiscal pressures is readily apparent, with the 
proportion of the older group rising and the proportion of working 
age people falling. 
Figure 1: Per Cent of Population Aged 15-64 years and 65+years, 2004 to 2050 
n life 
expectancy have exceeded earlier expectations, thereby making the 
po
, we show all figures as proportions of GNP. At this point, 
we
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We noted in the Introduction that improvements i
pulation projections underpinning earlier studies (such as 
Department of Finance, 1998 and EPC, 2001) out-dated. We can 
illustrate the difference by noting that the population projections in 
Department of Finance (1998) saw the percentage of the population 
aged 65 years and over rising to 27 per cent by 2056; based on the 
assumptions used here, the corresponding figure in 2056 would be 
29 per cent. Making a similar comparison but in terms of old-age 
dependency ratios, the Department of Finance (1998) value for 2056 
was 53 per cent whereas our assumptions lead to a value of 58 per 
cent.5
When presenting projections for the public finances in the next 
section
 will set out the approach and assumptions used in generating a 
GNP series out to 2050. We should stress that the approach used 
here differs from the approach used in short-term forecasting 
exercises such as the ESRI’s Quarterly Economic Commentary. As our 
interest is in the long term, we only attempt to project the long-run 
trend in national output. Actual output in the short and medium 
term will fluctuate around potential but we make no effort to 
capture this.  
5 These old-age dependency ratios are based on the population aged 19-64 years 
and not 15-64 years as is the case in Table 1.  
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The main building blocks in our GNP series are employment 
growth and productivity growth. By combining these with the 
bas
 each yearly 
age
we need to impose an unemployment rate. In doing this we 
dra
2032, 
wit
3). They forecast that productivity growth will 
ave
ity growth in the next year, GNP in real terms in the next 
yea
eline value for GNP in 2004, it is straightforward to generate a 
series. However, in order to produce figures for employment growth 
and productivity growth, more assumptions are needed. 
We generate employment growth in the following way. Our 
population projections provide the number of people in
 cohort by gender out to 2050. By applying age specific 
participation rates, we can generate a labour force series.  In the case 
of men, we assume that participations rates will not change over the 
projection period. However, in the case of women, it seems 
reasonable to assume that some increase will occur. We have chosen 
to assume that for the age groups 35-44 years and 45-55 years, the 
Irish female labour force participation rates will converge towards 
those of the EU-15 by 2015. For the age group 35-44 years, the 
current participation rate is 0.66 with the EU-15 figure being 0.77. 
The corresponding figures for the 45-54 year age group are 0.6 and 
0.71.  
In order to move from a labour force series to an employment 
series, 
w on Bergin et al. (2003); they forecast that the unemployment 
rate will fall from its current level of 4.3 per cent to 4 per cent in 
2015. We assume that it will then stay at that level out to 2050. 
These assumptions lead to a projected labour force out to 2050 
as shown in Figure 2. The labour force peaks at 2.29 million in 
h the increase between 2005 and 2032 being partly driven by the 
increases in female participation (up to 2015) and partly by increases 
in those of working age (up to 2032). While the working age 
population is increasing up to 2032 it should be remembered that 
the population aged 65 years and over is increasing at a faster rate 
and so the working age population is declining as a share of the total 
(as shown in Table 1 and Figure 1 above). After 2032, the labour 
force declines while the population aged 65 years and over continues 
to increase. It should also be noted that the aggregate participation 
rate declines over time as more people move into the 55-64 year age 
bracket and hence are assumed to have a lower age-specific 
participation rate. 
For assumptions on productivity growth, we draw again on 
Bergin et al. (200
rage 3 per cent out to 2010 and 2.3 per cent between 2011 and 
2020. Thereafter, we assume annual productivity growth rates of 2 
per cent. 
By multiplying GNP from one year by employment growth and 
productiv
r can be calculated. This can be translated into a nominal value by 
assuming a deflator – we assume 2.4 per cent and 2.2 per cent in 
2005 and 2006 respectively (drawing on McCoy et al., 2005) and 2 
per cent thereafter (drawing on Bergin et al., 2003). By assuming that 
wages will grow in line with productivity, we can generate a series 
for real and nominal wage growth. This is used when indexing some 
payments in the sections below. 
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Figure 2: Projec
ly to be 
aff population ageing, namely, social welfare, health and 
tion. The fourth heading is the total budget where we bring 
 Revised Estimates for Public Expenditure 2005 
(Department of Finance, 2005 hereafter referred to as REV 2005), 
rent year under both social 
tributory) old-age 
• t pension; 
change pulation aged 65 years and over. We also index to 
bo h nges in real earnings, thereby building in 
the nts under these programmes increase in 
line wit ings in the economy. In Table 2, we show the 
our baseline projections under four headings. The 
ted Labour Force and Population aged 65+ years, 2005-2050 
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0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
20
04
20
08
20
12
20
16
20
20
20
24
20
28
20
32
20
36
20
40
20
44
20
48
Popn aged 65+
Labour force
ne Results ected by 
educa
together all elements of the public finances, including the National 
Pensions Reserve Fund. 
4.1 SOCIAL WELFARE 
In projecting social welfare expenditure out to 2050, we took the 
following approach. The
provides spending figures for the cur
insurance and social assistance headings. Within each of these, the 
specific programmes are listed. This allows us to take the figures for 
spending on those aged 65 years and over and to project these 
figures forward indexing to the change in the population aged over 
65 years. The programmes that we include are as follows: 
• non-contributory old-age pension; 
• widows’, widowers’ and orphans’ (non-contributory) old-age 
pension; 
• contributory old-age pension; 
• widows’, widowers’ and orphans’ (con
pension; 
retiremen
• free schemes. 
As mentioned, we index spending under each to the percentage 
 in the po
th t e deflator and to cha
ayme assumption that p
h average earn
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projected trend in spending across these six programmes out to 
2050. The rise in spending as a percentage of GNP can be seen and 
also the acceleration. Although the figures reported in the EPC 
(2001) on public pensions are based on  slightly different definitions 
and assumptions, it is interesting to note the trebling in spending 
projected here as opposed to the doubling projected in EPC report 
(see Section 2 above). This can be explained in part by improving 
mortality, as noted in the Introduction. 
Table 2: Projected Old-age Social Welfare Spending (Assistance and 
Insurance) 2005-2050, Per Cent of GNP 
 
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Old-age SW as % of 
GNP 3.1 3.2 4.2 5.5 7.3 9.3 
 
e the old-age spending within the socialWhil  welfare budget has 
ceived attention in rcises such as Departm  
hi te nd  th m o d 
eceived less attention. But clearl  
hanging age structure of the population suggests the possibility of 
sav
re exe
01), c
ent of Fi
e for
nance
f chil(1998) and EPC (20
benefit payments) have r
ld-rela d spe ing (in
y, the
c
ings in the child-related area which may offset to some degree 
increased spending pressures in the area of old-age spending. In 
order to explore this issue, we take the spending figure for child 
benefit from the REV 2005 and index it to changes in the 
population aged 0-17 years out to 2050. We also index to our 
assumed values of the deflator and productivity, on the assumption 
again that payments rise in line with nominal earnings. The 
projections are presented in Table 3. While the payments are 
projected to fall as a percentage of GNP, the fall is modest. In order 
to understand why this is so, it is useful to look back at Table 1 and 
to note that while the proportion of children in the population is 
falling, so also is the proportion in the standard working age 
population. 
Table 3: Projected Spending on Child Benefit, 2005-2050 
 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Child benefit as % of GNP 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 
 
In Table 4, we add together the old-age and c
spending projections and also projections of the remainder o
hild-related 
f the 
social assistance and so s  ts he  o  
 p ents, we sim  ind o t han  
the otal population and to nominal earnings. Overall, it can be seen 
tha
cial in urance budge . In t  case f the
non-child/non-old-age aym ply ex t he c ge in
 t
t spending is projected to rise from 9.2 per cent of GNP in 2005 
to 16 per cent in 2050, a rise of 6.8 percentage points.  
Table 4: Projected Total Social Welfare Spending 2005-2050 
 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Social welfare spending 
 as % of GNP 9.2 9.2 10.3 11.9 13.6 16.0 
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4.2 HEALTH 
vely obvio at ati eing will 
have an impact on health spending, the literature in this area suggest 
at this may not in fact be the case. Empirical studies relating 
changes in health spending across countries to different rates of 
g have generally failed to find a relationship (for 
he figure is 
indexed to the deflator. In both cases, spending per under 65 years 
 
While it might seem intuiti us th popul on ag
th
population agein
example, see Barros (1998)). The explanation most frequently 
offered to explain this is that health spending is more strongly 
related to proximity to death (in particular in the last year of life) 
rather than age per se. As population ageing is related to reduced 
mortality, an increasing older population does not necessarily imply 
an increased population who are in their last year of life. The 
literature would also suggest that any impact of population ageing on 
health spending will be less than the potential impact of 
technological advances. 
The approach we take does factor in an ageing component into 
the projections on the assumption that the intuitive expectation is at 
least partly correct. But we acknowledge the possibility that this may 
over-state future pressures on health spending and compensate by 
not attempting to capture the spending pressures related to 
technological progress.  
The starting point for our projection is to take the REV 2005 
figure for the Health Services Executive, less the amount for long-
term care of the elderly and an amount for pensions as these are 
projected separately (see below). The figures in the REV show that 
two-thirds of this figure is related to pay so we divide the total into a 
pay and non-pay component in a two-thirds/one-third ratio.  
In order to allow us to factor in ageing we need some sense of 
the relative spending by age group. This is not readily available so 
instead we need to infer this using information from HIPE and 
NPRS Units, ESRI (2002). Data presented in this publication show 
those aged 65 years and over using hospital beds six times more 
intensively than those aged less than 65 years. Clearly, hospital bed 
usage is only one dimension of health service usage but in the 
absence of other data, this 6:1 ratio drives our forecasts.6
The projections are generated in the following way. We divide 
total spending in 2005 on the Health Services Executive (pay and 
non-pay separately) by the population aged under 65 years plus six 
times the population aged 65 years and over. This gives us a value for 
spending per under 65 years equivalent. In the case of pay, this figure is 
indexed to nominal earnings; in the case of non-pay, t
6 OECD (1987) suggests that a rule of thumb in apportioning health spending 
between age groups is to assume that people over 65 consume four times as much 
healthcare as those under 65 years. Given this, our 6:1 split might seem excessive. 
However, we should state again that we are not adjusting for the spending pressures 
associated with technological change. Cutler and Sheiner (2001) suggest that an 
indexing adjustment of 2.5 percentage points over nominal GNP growth could be 
required to capture this effect. In this context, our 6:1 age-split and no technology 
adjustment is actually quite conservative. 
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equ
a rate 
fast
ivalent is multiplied by the number of people aged under 65 
years plus six times the number of people aged over 65 years.  
The results are presented in Table 5. Starting at 7.7 per cent of 
GNP in 2005, spending falls out to 2010 and then begins to rise. 
After 2030, the rise accelerates with spending reaching 11.2 per cent 
of GNP by 2050. As discussed above, although our projections may 
over-state the impact of ageing, they almost certainly under-state the 
impact of technological change. One way of factoring this impact 
into the analysis is to allow the non-pay component to rise at 
er than the GNP deflator. If non-pay “health inflation” is 
assumed to be 1 percentage point higher each year out to 2050, 
health spending as a percentage of GNP in 2050 would be 12.1 per 
cent. 
Table 5: Projected Health Spending 2005-2050 
 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Health spending as % 
of GNP 7.7 7.4 7.9 8.6 9.8 11.0 
4.3 EDUCATION 
As noted in the Introduction, much of the 
population ageing has focused on the analysis
work in the area of 
 on spending that is 
likely to increase. How  as r of la eing is a 
oun on, it is necessary
spending on young people to  if t s 
 pressures for increased spending. We have 
nding on child benefit and in this sub-section 
Table 6. Spending is projected 
to 
ever,  the co ollary  popu tion ag
relatively smaller y g populati  to look at 
 see here are likely to be saving
which can offset the
already looked at spe
we will consider education. 
In projecting spending on education, we begin by taking the 
REV 2005 figures for first, second and third level spending. Each of 
the three is then indexed to nominal wage growth and to changes in 
the population in the respective age category. The balance (less 
pensions) is indexed to nominal GNP growth (which, of course, is 
equivalent to keeping it constant as a share of nominal GNP). The 
results of the projection are shown in 
fall from 5.1 per cent of GNP in 2005 to 4.3 per cent in 2050. 
This saving of 0.7 percentage points is clearly small relative to the 
projected spending increases in social welfare and health. Even when 
combined with the projected saving on child benefit (0.2 percentage 
points of GNP, as shown in Table 3, the youth-related spending 
reduction is less than 1 per cent of GNP. What is more, the implicit 
assumptions in this projection include no increase in participation 
and no improvements in service quality. Both are likely to be 
violated and so spending on education in 2050 may well exceed the 
projected 4.3 per cent of GNP, thereby removing most and if not all 
of the potential saving. 
Table 6: Projected Education Spending 2005-2050 
 
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Education Spending 
as % of GNP 5.1 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.4 
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4.4 TOTAL BUDGET 
Having looked at each component of public spending, we now turn 
roduce a measure 
f the overall pressure on the public finances as a result of ageing. 
e appro ou  to  th sh ns
ee what would happen to t
deficit a tional deb er time. The blem with pr h 
d deficit figures that are unrealistic and so 
this reason, we take another approach. We 
ve approach. On the basis of our assumptions, 
spe
ntly 5 per cent of GNP, a level that is substantially higher 
tha
 this will occur is difficult. We assume that this will 
hap
to the total budget. Our goal in this section is to p
o
One possibl ach w ld be  hold e tax are co tant at 
the 2005 level and 
nd na
to s
t ov
he Exchequer 
this appro oac
is that it leads to debt an
difficult to interpret. For 
ask what tax share, if held constant out to 2050, would ensure that 
the Exchequer deficit does not exceed 5 per cent in 2050 and use 
this as a measure of age-related fiscal pressure. In order to determine 
the “sustainable” tax share, we need projections on all elements of 
the public finances. At this point, we set out here how we produced 
the projections for the items not yet discussed and present the 
figures in Table 7. 
Spending on long-term care for the elderly is indexed to changes 
in the population aged 65 years and over and to nominal earnings. 
This may well be a conservative approach to projecting spending on 
this area because Ireland’s system of long-term care is currently 
based more on informal care-giving relative to elsewhere. An 
increase in formal care, such as through nursing homes, would see 
spending rise even in the absence of population ageing. Here, we 
take the conservati
nding on long-term care for the elderly would rise from 0.8 per 
cent of GNP to 2.4 per cent in 2050. 
Public sector pensions have been modelled by drawing on the 
work on the Commission on Public Service Pensions (2000). The 
category “rest of gross voted” is a residual and is indexed to nominal 
GNP. Debt interest is calculated as being 6 per cent of the National 
Debt in the preceding period. Given our assumed deflator of 2 per 
cent, this means we are assuming a long-term interest rate of 4 per 
cent. The remainder of Central Fund spending is indexed to nominal 
GNP. 
Summing across the expenditure categories gives gross current 
expenditure. From this, we need to subtract appropriations-in-aid so 
as to arrive at net current expenditure. In the case of contributions 
to the Social Insurance Fund, we assume a growth rate equal to 
nominal GNP.  
With regard to capital expenditure, there is one important 
assumption that needs to be set out. Gross voted capital expenditure 
is curre
n in other developed economies. This high level reflects the 
Government’s commitment to reducing Ireland’s infrastructural 
deficit. Once the deficit has been filled, it will be possible to reduce 
spending on infrastructure to more usual levels. However, 
anticipating when
pen around 2020 and so hold gross voted capital expenditure at 
5 per cent of GNP until 2020 and 2.5 per cent thereafter. The other 
important elements of capital expenditure (non-voted and 
contributions to the NPRF) are projected to grow in line with 
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nominal GNP. In this case of the NPRF, this is in accordance with 
the relevant legislation that requires that a contribution of 1 per cent 
of GNP be made up until 2055, even through withdrawals can begin 
in 2025. 
There is a range of other elements of the public finance that are 
not shown in Table 7 but which are used when calculating the tax 
rate needed for sustainable public finances. Hence, we need to 
outline how we handle these in the projections. For capital revenues, 
we keep them constant as a percentage of GNP except in the case of 
receipts from the National Pensions Reserve Fund. No withdrawals 
are allowed until after 2025. Thereafter, we initially assume a 
withdrawal rate of 3 per cent per annum. Our choice of this 
per
ed 
the
ment Balance. 
tal gross spending is 
pro
 
centage is somewhat arbitrary and is based on the Fund having a 
value of 50 per cent of GNP at the end of our projection period.  
The remaining elements are as follows. A “contingency” item is 
included in order to be consistent with the Department of Finance 
practice in providing budget projections. As noted in the tables 
accompanying Budget 2005 “… a prudent contingency provision is 
made against factors outside the control of government that may 
impact upon the Budget but which cannot be foreseen” 
(Department of Finance, 2004, p. D.6). We have taken the 
Department of Finance figures for 2006 and 2007 and have index
 2007 figure to nominal GNP – this implies a contingency of 1 
per cent of GNP out to 2050.  
The national debt figure is generated by adding the Exchequer 
balance each year. The debt interest is included in the expenditure 
figure as discussed above. The NPRF figure is generated by adding 
contributions, subtracting outflows and adding in interest earned. As 
was the case with interest on the national debt, we assume a long-
term real interest rate of 4 per cent. This interest earned is also 
factored into the analysis in the movement between the Exchequer 
balance and the General Govern
Table 7 contains our projections for all elements of public 
spending out to 2050 and receipt figures for 2005. It should be 
noted that the Central Fund figure is not a projection. As interest 
payments on the national debt form a significant part of this figure, 
this item would increase to an unrealistic level if the tax share was 
kept at 30 per cent. When calculating the sustainable tax share, the 
Central Fund is allowed to vary in line with interest payments. 
Taking that qualification, it can be seen that to
jected to rise from 32.5 per cent of GNP in 2005 to 44 per cent 
of GNP in 2050, with net spending rising from 25.8 per cent to 37.5 
per cent (the main difference being payments to the Exchequer from 
the Social Insurance Fund (SIF)). 
While Table 7 provides a sense of the extent of the fiscal 
pressures, it is useful to have a single measure. As discussed above 
our approach is to ask by how much current receipts would have to 
be raised as a proportion of GNP in 2006 if a sustainable public 
finance path is to be achieved, assuming this proportion is held 
constant out to 2050. 
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Table 7: Public Spending Projections 2005-2050 (as Per Cent of GNP) 
Year 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Health 7.7 7.4 7.9 8.6 9.8 11.2 
Long-term care 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.4 
Education  5.1 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.4 
Non-SIF Social Welfare 4.9 4.9 5.1 5.4 5.9 6.6 
Expenditure from SIF 4.3 4.4 5.2 6.3 7.7 9.4 
Public sector pensions 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.3 
Rest of gross voted 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 
Central Fund (2005 value assumed 
 throughout) 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Gross current expenditure 32.5 31.9 34.1 36.6 39.8 44 
Appropriations in Aid (including SIF) 6.7 6.7 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 
Net Current Expenditure 25.8 25.2 27.6 30.1 33.3 37.5 
Net Capital Expenditure 6.3 6.7 6.7 4.2 4.2 4.2 
Total net spending 32.1 31.9 34.3 34.3 37.5 41.7 
Current receipts in 2005 29           
Capital resources in 2005 1      
 
Followi this ap ach, w ched fo  a curr eceipt are 
uld p the hequer deficit below 5 per t of GNP in 
2050. Th share  wou hieve  turn t to .3 
per cent (as opposed to the 2005 share of 29 per cent). The path of 
both the Ex equer deficit and bt this t hare in ace 
are show able he ne e sig fore on bt 
figures show that from the mid-2010s, the national debt actually 
becomes an accumulated surplus that will be run down in future 
ecades. In  sense, the high tax hare in the earlier p riod allows the 
x
ng pro e sear r ent r  sh
that wo  kee Exc  cen
e tax  that ld ac  this ed ou be 33
 
ch the de with ax s  pl
n in T  8. T gativ ns be  the nati al de
d
E
 a  s e
chequer to save for the future and so what is being modelled is 
equivalent to higher contributions to the NPRF. 
Table 8: Deficit, GGB, Debt and NPRF Figures Under a 33.3 Per Cent 
Tax Share 
 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Exchequer balance -2.3 1.8 0.8 3.2 0.9 -4.7 
General Government 
 Balance (GGB) -0.8 3.6 3.2 5.2 3.1 -2.2 
National debt 28.2 13.9 -4.3 -28.9 -38.1 -7.1 
NPRF 9.4 14.0 26.1 36.4 43.4 50.7 
 
It is useful to translate the required increase in the tax share into 
the impact, for example, on the top tax rate. Based on figures
o us by th
 
provided t e Department of Finance, a 1 per cent increase 
 the top rate of incom yi bo 00 n re  
x sha ou to € bill (€1 illi y 
requi in the top rate of 
in e tax elds a ut €2  millio . The quired
increase in the ta re am nts 5.5 ion 30 b on b
0.043) and so the red increase tax would be 
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over 27 percentage po n ur ra 4 e  
 any tax increase w d b ead r a e o he s 
but this figure does still point to the impact.  
emembered that the 
sus
 at which withdrawals are made from the NPRF. 
Ra er than imposing each new assumption individually on the 
line, we will add them sequentially. We then ask what tax share 
 2016 onwards). We present the results 
on assumption in Table 9.  
rrent Expenditure figure with that in 
5. 
ints o the c rent te of 2 per c nt. In
reality, oul e spr  ove  rang f tax ading
While the tax increase would be unwelcome for those impacted 
upon, we should note that a tax share of under 34 per cent would 
still leave Ireland a relatively low-taxed economy. The average tax 
share in the OECD in 2004 was 37.5 per cent, with countries such 
as Germany and France having substantially higher tax shares (44 
per cent and 50.7 per cent respectively). Also, a tax share in the 
region of 34 per cent would only return Ireland to where it was in 
the mid-1990s. Hence, the situation does not appear to be 
unsustainable. However, it should be r
tainable tax share of 33.3 per cent is based on increasing taxes 
today; by postponing tax increases into the future, the increases will 
have to be higher. 
 
 As long-term forecasts of the type presented here are subject to 
enormous uncertainty, it is important to vary the assumptions used 
in Section 4 to see if the resulting scenario is altered significantly. In 
this section, we investigate two alternative assumptions. First, we 
assume a higher rate of net inward migration to establish the extent 
to which migration can ease the age-related fiscal pressures. Second, 
we increase the rate
Altering the 
Assumptions
th
base
would be needed in 2006 to achieve a sustainable public finance 
path, just as we did above. 
5.1 HIGHER MIGRATION 
Under our alternative migration assumption, the inflows are 
incorporated into the demographic model as follows: we assume 
that net inflows will be 30,000 in 2005 and 2006; 30,000 annually 
between 2006 and 2010 (earlier this was 20,000); 30,000 also 
annually between 2011 and 2015 (as opposed to 10,000 earlier); 
20,000 annually to 2025 and 15,000 thereafter (our earlier 
assumption was 5,000 from
under the new (higher) net migrati
If we compare the Gross Cu
Table 7, we get a sense of the contribution which higher 
immigration can make in alleviating the fiscal pressures associated 
with population ageing. Whereas in the lower immigration scenario, 
gross current spending would reach 44 per cent of GNP in 2050, 
under the higher immigration scenario, the corresponding figure is 
41.5 per cent. While this shows that immigration can contribute to 
solving the problem, it also shows that immigration is likely to play 
only a partial role. 
As before, we can ask what current tax share, if held constant 
from 2005 onwards, would lead to sustainable public finances as 
defined above. A tax share of 32 per cent leads to an Exchequer 
deficit of just under 55 in 2050. 
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Table 9: Public Spending Projections 2005-2050 Under a Higher 
Migration Assumption (as Per Cent of GNP) 
Year 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Health 7.7 7.4 7.6 8.2 9.2 10.3 
Long-term care 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.7 2.2 
Education  5.1 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.3 
Non-SIF Social Welfare 4.9 4.8 5.0 5.3 5.7 6.3 
Expenditure from SIF 4.3 4.3 5.0 5.9 7.1 8.6 
Public sector pensions 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.1 
Rest of gross voted 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 
 
Central Fund (2005 
 value assumed 
 throughout) 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Gross current exp 32.5 31.6 33.3 35.3 38 41.5 
5.2 HIGHER NAT AL EN N SER  F D 
TIO  
we ed  3 p ent e N F 
ch ye ter . In  sce o, we double this 
nd ask once again what current tax share, if held 
005 onwards, would lead to sustainable public 
igure thi ime is .7 pe ent a  the r lting ths 
bt and F es ow Ta 10. 
 1
ION  P SIO RE VE UN
CONTRIBU NS
In the baseline projection, assum  the er c of th PR
was withdrawn ea ar af 2025  this nari
withdrawal rate a
constant from 2
finances. The f s t  31 r c nd esu  pa
of the deficit, de  NPR  figur are sh n in ble 
Table 0: Deficit, GGB, Debt and NPRF Figures Under Higher 
Immigration, a Higher NPRF Withdrawal Rate and a 31.7 Per 
Cent Tax Share 
 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Exchequer balance -2.3 0.0 -1.1 2.0 -0.1 -5.0 
General Government Balance 
(GGB) -0.8 1.9 1.3 3.0 0.9 -4.0 
National debt 28.2 21.3 15.0 -3.6 -11.0 16.3 
NPRF 9.4 13.9 24.9 29.9 28.2 27.6 
 
Before ending this section, we should report that we looked at 
ications of altering one more assumption, namely, fertility. the impl
In our baseline forecasts, the total fertility rate is assumed to fall to 
85 by 2011 and to rema st e r u r  
we keep otal ility rate constant at 2. The 
For mp  th ase , h  
spending 11.2 cent of GNP in 2050; in the 
ty scenario, the e i  p nt.
B6. 
1. in con ant th reafte . In o r alte native
fertility scenario, the t  fert
impact turns out to be limited.  exa le, in e b line ealth
is projected to rise 
higher fertili
to 
 figur
per 
s 10.9 er ce   
 
 
efore recapping on the results, it is useful to consider one 
additional item, namely, what happens post-2050. In order to take a 
brief look at this issue, we ran our population projections out to 
2075 to see if the process of population ageing continues. In Figure 
3, we show the projected percentage of the population aged 65 years 
and over, where the assumptions are those in our baseline. It can be 
Summary and 
Conclusions
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seen in the figure that while the process of population ageing ceases 
around 2050, the percentage of people aged 65 years and over settles 
at a level of 30 per cent. Hence, while the process of population 
g may not continue after 2050, neither will it go into reverse. 
e
stainable path out to 2050. It should be noted that all of these 
figu
 this paper suggest 
tha
agei
 
r Cent of Population Aged 65 years and Over, 2002 to 2075 
n
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The results from our projections suggest that spending on health, 
long-term care and social welfare combined could rise from 17.7 per 
cent of GNP in 2005 to 29.6 per cent in 2050 (under the higher 
migration assumption, the figure for 2050 is 27.4 per cent). While 
contributions from the NPRF will contribute to funding this age-
related additional spending, a gap will still remain. In the context of 
higher migration and 6 per cent withdrawals from the NPRF every 
year from 2026 on, an increase in current receipts from 29 per cent 
of GNP to 31.7 per cent would keep the public finances on a 
su
res are based on annual productivity increases of 2 per cent in 
the long run and increasing female participation.  
Although Ireland is facing age-related fiscal challenges it is in a 
relatively good position to deal with these challenges. With a low 
debt level and low rates of taxation, the public finance base is solid. 
However, it will be important to maintain these features so that the 
age-related pressures do not destabilise the public finances or lead to 
tax increases at a level that could depress economic activity. With 
this in mind, we would argue that, at a minimum, the current level of 
contribution to the NPRF be maintained.  
While care should be exercised in maintaining the quality of the 
public finances generally, the figures presented in
t the Government should be mindful of the potential long-run 
costs of entering commitments. In this context, it is instructive to 
consider the cost in 2005 of increasing old age pensions and to 
project the cost implications in 2050. The weekly payment under the 
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old-age contributory pension is currently about 32 per cent of gross 
average industrial earnings. Were this to be increased to 40 per cent 
(and all the other social welfare pension payments raised 
accordingly), we estimate that the cost in 2005 would increase by 0.8 
per
human capital. Third, when we imposed a higher tax share 
to 
 cent of GNP. In 2050, the extra cost would be 2.3 per cent of 
GNP.  
As a final note, we should point to three limitations in our 
analysis that could result in the age-related fiscal pressures being 
stronger than suggested. First, we have made no adjustment for the 
possibility of productivity rising less rapidly in an ageing population. 
To the extent that older workers may have skills that are obsolete, 
our GNP projections may be overly optimistic. Second, we have 
assumed that immigrants are as productive as domestic workers and 
this may not be true, at least in the years immediately after 
immigrants arrive when they may have lower levels of location-
specific 
achieve a sustainable path for the public finances, we made no 
allowance for the potential negative impact of such tax rises on 
economic activity. Were such impacts to be significant, our GNP 
projections would again be overly optimistic and hence our estimate 
of fiscal pressures and percentages of GNP may be understated. 
20 
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PERSPECTIVES ON 
RETIREMENT SAVING 
POLICIES IN IRELAND 
John McHale* 
 There is a danger of Irish households becoming deaf to the 
persistent clamour telling them they are not saving enough for 
retirement. But with overall economic growth showing remarkable 
robustness, not having put aside enough during working years may 
now be the single biggest threat to living standards many Irish 
people face. Of course, under-saving for retirement is by no means a 
uniquely Irish problem. Large-scale studies of households in the 
United States, for example, show that the median household reaches 
retirement with very low levels of financial wealth.1 And the recent 
Pensions Green Paper in the United Kingdom has pointed a large 
savings shortfall for a significant minority of the workforce.2 
1. 
Introduction
*Queen’s School of Business, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, K7L4V1, 
Canada. I am grateful to the editors Tim Callan and Aedín Doris for their support. 
Thanks are also due to Daniel McCoy and to the ESRI reviewers for their very 
useful feedback. I would also like to thank my colleague Laurence Ashworth for 
valuable discussions and comments. 
1 Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996) report that median level of all personal financial 
assets of families with heads between 55 and 64 years was just $8,300 in 1991. 
Almost 20 per cent of families had no financial assets at all. It should be noted that 
not all experts agree that there is widespread under-saving for retirement in the 
United States. Scholz et al. (2004) use a rich life-cycle model to argue that fewer than 
20 per cent of households have less wealth than their inferred optimal targets. One 
criticism of their approach is that they include the equity in homes as part of 
household wealth, since many households are unwilling or unable to run down this 
equity to finance their retirement (see, for example, Venti and Wise (2001)).  
2 The Green Paper notes that there is no “right” replacement rate. Instead, two 
different benchmarks are used for assessing the adequacy of the gross replacement 
rate: one-half and two-thirds. The paper finds that around 3 million people appear 
to be seriously undersaving for retirement, with projected gross replacement rates 
of under 50 per cent, and there are “a further 5 to 10 million people with estimated 
replacement rates at the lower end of our range of half to two-thirds” (Annex 4, p. 
157).  
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Interestingly, surveys indicate that many individuals recognize they 
are not saving enough and wish to save more.3  
There is one reason for being especially concerned about post-
retirement living standards in Ireland, however. The country is 
almost unique in the OECD in not having an earnings-related state 
pension or mandatory earnings-related private provision.4 The flat-
rate state pension provides a relatively low level of replacement for a 
worker with average earnings.5 Of course, many households are not 
solely reliant on the state pension for their retirement income needs. 
Yet just over half the workforce had pension coverage in 2004.6 For 
recent retirees, Hughes and Watson (2005) have calculated gross 
replacement rates averaging 51 per cent for couples and 43 per cent 
for singles in the year following retirement based on all income 
sources.7   
These numbers suggest that many Irish households experience a 
significant drop in consumption at retirement.8 On the basis of US 
3 Choi et al. (2001), for example, report the results of a survey where a sample of 
employees at a large US food company where asked about their views on the 
adequacy of their own savings. When they asked the employees how much they 
should ideally be saving for retirement answer averaged 13.9 per cent. When asked 
to evaluate the adequacy of their own actual savings rate, two-thirds reported that 
they their savings were too low relative to their ideal rate, one-third thought their 
saving was about right, and just 1 employee (out of 195) thought their savings rate 
was too high.  
4 New Zealand is the other exception.  
5 In a comparative analysis of state pension systems, the OECD (2005) finds that a 
worker on average earnings has a lower replacement rate in Ireland (31 per cent) 
than in any other OECD country. The OECD average is 57 per cent. The OECD 
also reports that the net replacement rate is 37 per cent, which compares with an 
OECD average of 64 per cent.  
6 Based on estimates from the Quarterly National Household Survey, 52.4 per cent 
of all persons between the ages of 20 and 69 years in employment had pension 
coverage. This compares with a figure of 51.2 per cent in the first quarter of 2002. 
This small increase probably reflects the introduction of Personal Saving 
Retirement Accounts. These accounts will be discussed later in the paper.  
7 Their data combines from all waves of the Living in Ireland Survey between 1994 
and 2001. Unfortunately, despite the pooling from different waves the number of 
cases is small, with 200 pensioner couples and 60 single pensioners. Interpreting 
these rates is complicated by the fact that some people – often those with relatively 
generous occupational or personal pensions – retire before reaching 65 years. 
Hughes and Watson also report that in 2001 the median income of people 65 years 
and over was just 62 per cent of the median income of those aged less than 65 years 
in Ireland, which compares with an average of 83 per cent in the EU-15. 
8 I thank the referees for pointing out that drops in consumption can be quite 
different from drops in income. In addition to reductions in working-related 
expenses, Irish retirees receive a valuable package of non-cash benefits (free 
telephone, free travel, etc.). Retirees are also likely to have relatively low housing-
related expenses. Work by Layte et al. (1999) finds that many elderly avoid severe 
deprivation despite having relatively low incomes. But the authors also find that a 
significant number of households experience both severe deprivation and have low 
incomes.  Short of such severe deprivation, having a low replacement rate is bound 
to force changes to how lives are lived for many households that must rely 
exclusively on the state pension. This is likely to be especially true for households 
who experience rapid growth in earnings during their working life, so that their final 
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data, Bernheim et al. (2001) argue that it is difficult to reconcile 
observed drops in consumption at retirement with models of 
rational, farsighted life-cycle planners.9 To properly understand 
savings behaviour, it seems necessary to introduce certain 
behavioural tendencies – such as bounded rationality when faced 
with complex life cycle planning problems and the problems of self 
control when faced with the lure of instant gratification – that lie 
outside the rational choice framework.10  
In this paper, I examine a number of policy initiatives designed to 
increase collective and individual saving in Ireland. The resulting 
alphabet soup of policies – the National Pensions Reserve Fund 
(NPRF), Personal Retirement Savings Accounts (PRSAs) and Special 
Savings Investment Accounts (SSIAs) – suggest that this has been an 
active area of public-policy innovation. I will briefly review what I 
see as the merits of these programmes, and offer a suggestion for an 
additional policy that I believe will help households move closer to 
their desired saving rates without having to resort to heavy-handed 
government compulsion.  
From an analytical perspective, the paper makes use of two 
relatively non-standard (but increasingly discussed) literatures. The 
first relates to the political risk that exists in all state-run pension 
systems. This is the risk that benefit rules will be made less generous 
before or during your retirement, typically due to an ageing-induced 
increase in the total cost to future generations of funding the 
benefits. Drawing on the idea of political risk, I argue that the NPRF 
can be viewed as a mechanism to help ensure that today’s levels of 
benefit generosity can be sustained. The fund also makes it easier for 
a prudent government to increase benefit generosity for current 
retirees, despite the fact that those increases become very expensive 
as the elderly dependency rate rises. The second is work in 
behavioural economics that studies the present bias that hinders many 
of us in making the private retirement provision that we know is 
right for us when we adopt a more “temporally detached” 
perspective. The findings from this research help shed light on the 
surprising popularity of the SSIAs, and also provide clues to other 
policies for increasing retirement saving.  
income is far higher than their average income (and thus capacity to save) over that 
life.   
9 Banks et al. (1998) also find evidence of significant drops in consumption at 
retirement in the United Kingdom. They find that part of the drop can be explained 
by the complementarity between working and consumption. They argue that the 
only way to reconcile the unexplained fall in consumption with the life-cycle 
hypothesis is to assume a systematic arrival of unexpected adverse information at 
retirement. Hurd and Rohwedder (2003) provide evidence that consumption 
changes at retirement are fully anticipated. They infer that the observed declines 
must be due to the ending of work-related expenses and the substitution of home 
production for market-purchased goods and services. An alternative explanation is 
the declines were anticipated, but behavioural failings made it difficult for 
households to put the necessary saving adjustments in place.  
10 See, for example, Thaler (1994).  
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, 
I provide a very brief discussion of Ireland’s state pension system 
and discuss the merits of the recent shift to pre-funding future 
benefit obligations via the NPRF. Section 3 then turns to tax-based 
inducements for retirement saving, with particular focus on the 
recently introduced PRSAs. This leads to a discussion of ideas from 
the behavioural economics literature about how people actually make 
saving decisions in Section 4. Section 5 then applies these ideas to 
help understand the reasons for the popularity of the SSIA scheme. 
In Section 6, I attempt to combine the lessons from the behavioural 
economics research and the lessons learned from the SSIAs to 
sketch the outlines of a policy that I think would significantly 
increase retirement saving in low-cost financial instruments while 
preserving freedom of choice. Section 7 offers some concluding 
thoughts. 
 
 
2.1 THE STATE PENSION 
2. 
Pre-Funding 
State Pensions
The outstanding feature of the Irish pensions system is the absence 
of an earnings-related state pension. Among OECD countries, only 
Australia, Ireland, Mexico and New Zealand lack what is typically 
called a second-tier pension that links pension payments to an 
individual’s earnings history (OECD, 2005).11 Instead, the Irish 
system depends solely on two forms of flat-rate pension. Social 
assistance pensions are non-contributory, means-tested and payable 
to those aged 66 years and over.12 Social insurance pensions are 
contributory, non-means-tested and payable at age 65 years.13 
The strengths of the Irish system are that it is relatively 
inexpensive and it redistributes towards the lifetime poor (by 
combining flat rate benefits with earnings-related contributions).14 
11 Australia and Mexico mandate contributions to defined contribution private 
accounts.  
12 The maximum payment from the Old Age (Non-Contributory) Pension to a 
single individual is €166 per week in 2005. Benefit eligibility falls to zero if the 
individual has a weekly income of over €170.10 per week.  
13 There are actually two forms of contributory pensions. The Retirement Pension 
is payable at age 65 years, but is conditional on actual retirement. No retirement test 
is applicable to the Old Age (Contributory) Pension. However, this pension is not 
available until age 66. The benefit payable to an individual without dependents is 
€179.30 from both contributory pensions in 2005. Along with other benefits, 
contributory pensions are funded by contributions made by employees (4 per cent 
of earnings up to €44,180) and employers (10.75 per cent of earnings without limit). 
See McHale (2002) and Hughes and Watson (2005) for more details on the Irish 
pensions system.  
14 One problem with such a system is that the PRSI contributions are viewed as a 
pure tax by the employee, since additional contributions do not translate to 
additional benefits (assuming qualification for full benefits). This raises the overall 
marginal tax rate to employees who are below the contribution ceiling. The 
resulting additional distortion to labour supply may be significant given the well-
known fact that the distortion rises with the square of the marginal tax rate.   
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The chief weakness of the system is that it provides low replacement 
rates for many workers, putting them at risk of substantial drops in 
living standards at retirement. Using a stylised model of the system, 
the OECD (2005) calculated that a worker on average earnings over 
their working life would have a gross replacement rate of 30.6 per 
cent and a net replacement rate of 36.6 per cent. A worker earning 
twice average earnings would have gross and net replacement rates 
of just 15.3 and 21.9 per cent respectively. It should be noted that 
some systems with complicated formulas for determining earnings-
related benefits actually end up with little more differentiation in 
benefits than are observed in Ireland. The OECD (2005) has 
usefully calculated measures of benefit dispersion (measured by the 
Gini coefficient) as implied by their country-specific state pension 
models. The Gini coefficient is zero for Ireland given its pure flat-
rate benefit system, which compares to an average OECD Gini of 
0.16. But the mere existence of a complicated earnings-related state 
pension does not guarantee differentiation in benefits. Canada, for 
example, has a relatively complicated earnings-related system, but 
ends up with a Gini coefficient not much greater than Ireland’s at 
0.04 – the system is full of sound and fury but in the end gives all 
retirees roughly similar amounts. One problem with such a system is 
that higher earning retirees may be surprised by how little of their 
income the state pension replaces.15 The Irish system at least has the 
virtue of transparency: workers can form reasonably accurate 
expectations of future state benefits based on widely known benefit 
levels for current retirees. I will return below to the question of 
whether this is likely to be enough to induce the saving necessary to 
sustain living standards in retirement. 
2.2 THE NATIONAL PENSION RESERVE FUND 
In common with all industrialised countries, Ireland faces a 
significant ageing of its population structure in coming decades. The 
resulting increases in old age dependency rates are generally very 
good news, reflecting as they do the fact that people are living 
longer. Of course, the coming surge in dependency rates also reflects 
the retirement of the post-WWII baby-boom generation in most 
countries. Helpfully, Ireland’s baby boom came later than in other 
countries, giving the government some additional time to deal to 
prepare for ageing-related fiscal costs.   
Figure 1 shows the evolution of two measures of the old age 
dependency rate in Ireland: the ratio of the population aged 65 years 
and over to the population aged between 15 and 64 years, and the 
ratio of the population aged 65 years and over to the population 
aged between 25 and 64 years. With an increasing proportion of the 
15 In the case of Canada, the OECD estimates a gross replacement rate of 42.5 per 
cent for someone on average earnings, a rate which falls to 21.3 per cent for 
someone at twice average earnings.  
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population now staying in school until their early twenties, the latter 
is probably a better measure of the old age dependency “burden.” 
 
Figure 1: Old Age Dependency Rates in Ireland 
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Using the latter measure also highlights the favourable 
demographic window that the government has to prepare for the 
fiscal costs of an ageing population. The dependency rate dropped 
after 1990 and is not projected to return to the 1990 level until after 
2020. Figure 2 shows how dependency rates in Ireland have deviated 
from those in Europe as a whole. European dependency rates have 
been increasing since 1990, with the rate of increase set to rise 
markedly after 2010. The figure also shows the Irish dependency rate 
converging to the European rate by mid-century. Thus the delayed 
Irish baby boom only postpones the fiscal crunch. It is well known 
that in a pure pay-as-you-go pension system an increasing 
dependency rate must mean either higher contribution rates or lower 
benefits rates (expressed as a share of average earnings). The only 
way to avoid this unpleasant arithmetic is to pre-fund part of the 
future benefits. In effect, the current generation of workers are partly 
paying for themselves a part of what future workers were to have 
paid for.  
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Figure 2:  Old Age Dependency Rates in Ireland and Europe, 65+ / 25-64 Years 
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In its effort to take advantage of the demographic window, the 
Irish government is pre-funding part of the cost of future benefits 
with the National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF). Starting in 1999, 
the plan was to put aside 1 per cent of GNP each year until 2055 
regardless of the state of the economy.16 Disbursements of the fund 
are prohibited until 2025. The value of the fund had already reached 
9.6 per cent of GNP by the end of 2004. Figure 3 shows the 
hypothetical evolution of the fund based on given GNP growth 
assumptions, a real rate of return on the fund of 4 per cent, and a 
drawdown schedule that would exhaust the fund by 2055. These 
simple calculations show that the fund should significantly ease the 
burden on future generations of funding the pensions of today’s 
younger workers.  
 
 
 
 
16 In addition, the proceeds from the privatisation of Eircom were invested in the 
fund.  
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Figure 3: Hypothetical Evolution of the National Pensions Reserve 
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Is the NPRF good policy? The most common rationale for pre-
funding is intergenerational equity. The argument is simply that it is 
unfair to place the burden of ageing-related costs on future workers. 
This rationale has been strongly questioned by the ESRI in its 2003 
Medium-Term Review (see also Fitz Gerald, 2004). The Review authors 
point out that today’s workers already face a high burden from the 
direct monetary and disruption costs of closing the infrastructure 
deficit. The benefits of this infrastructure will be enjoyed by future 
workers (who hopefully will also be earning substantially higher 
incomes), so that having these workers meet the higher pension 
burden does not seem like an unreasonable quid pro quo.  
This argument raises serious doubts about the intergenerational 
equity rationale. But there is another possible rationale for the pre-
funding of future benefit obligations that is addressed directly to the 
self-interest of current workers: pre-funding can be a means of 
securing promised benefits from younger generations. The key issue 
here is what is referred to as political risk in intergenerational transfer 
systems. This is the risk that future politicians will change the rules 
that govern pension entitlement and generosity. A number of 
OECD governments have already substantially changed the rules 
applying to future retirees, resulting in substantial reductions in 
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pension wealth (see, for example, McHale, 2001). Most of the 
changes have taken place in earnings-related systems, and have 
involved such reforms as changed indexing rules, later retirement 
ages and altered formulas for linking past earnings to pension 
benefits.  
The changeable parameters are obviously far less for Ireland’s flat 
rate system. One possible change would be to shift from the current 
implicit indexation to earnings to indexation to prices. This would 
amount to an effective and growing benefit rate cuts assuming 
positive real wage growth. But with the current relatively low 
replacement rate and the Government’s intention to see it rise, it is 
hard to imagine significant cutbacks in the Irish case. Having said 
that, improvements to benefit generosity are difficult for prudent 
governments facing rising dependency rates because they impose 
heavy future fiscal burdens even if they are quite affordable today. 
Thus population ageing is likely to constrain needed near-term 
benefit increases. The ability to pre-fund gives the government more 
room to increase benefits. I will argue later that it is important 
private provision for retirement increases so that there is less 
dependence on the state pension. But the state pension – limited 
though it is – is likely to remain a key (and for some the only) source 
of retirement income. The NPRF strikes me, as a helpful device in 
securing and sustaining needed increases in its generosity.   
 
 
3.1 TAX-FAVOURED SAVING IN IRELAND 
3. 
Tax-Based 
Inducements to 
Save for 
Retirement
Practically all OECD countries provide some form of tax 
inducement to encourage saving for retirement. The absence of 
earnings-related state pensions makes such inducements all the more 
central in the Irish case, as they serve as the primary public policy 
tool for ensuring adequate income replacement. The tax deferment 
mechanisms are available for employer and employee contributions 
to occupational pensions, and also individual contributions to 
personal pensions such as Registered Annuity Contracts (RACs) and 
Personal Retirement Savings Accounts (PRSAs). Moreover, tax relief 
is provided at an individual’s marginal tax rate, so the value of the 
relief is greater for higher earners.  
These inducements do not come cheap. Hughes and Watson 
(2005) note that the tax foregone in 2000/1 was equal to €1.5 billion 
– almost as much as the direct spending on the pension system of 
€1.6 billion. One complication in determining the cost is that taxes 
on contributions and fund accruals are generally deferred to the 
withdrawal phase rather than forgiven altogether. Thus the tax 
revenue sacrifice now leads to a tax revenue windfall later. Yoo and 
de Serres (2004) have usefully applied a common methodology for a 
number of OECD countries to determine the present discounted 
value of the net tax loss from a euro’s worth of contribution.17 In the 
17 The benchmark is a euro contribution to non-tax favoured savings.  
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Irish case, they find that a euro contribution leads to a tax loss of 21 
cents on the contribution, 19 cents of tax loss on accrued income 
over the lifetime of the investment, and 11 cents of tax gain when 
the money is withdrawn. This gives a net loss of 29 cents in present 
value terms. Although substantially higher tax losses are found for a 
number of other countries, the overall budgetary costs (1.9 per cent 
of GDP) are higher for Ireland than for any of the other countries 
considered. The reason is that the average contribution as a share of 
average earnings (37.6 per cent) is higher for Ireland than for any of 
the other countries, which in turn is the result of the absence of a 
state earnings-related pension.  
The biggest criticism of Ireland’s tax-favoured savings regime is 
that the benefits go disproportionately to the better off. Based on 
data from 2000, Hughes and Watson (2005) find that occupational 
and personal pensions provide “virtually no income during 
retirement for pensioners in the bottom three-fifths of the income 
distribution” (General Summary, p. III). They stress the inequity of 
government providing far more support to the average holder of an 
occupational or personal pension than to an average recipient of the 
state pension.  
How serious an objection is the regressivity of these tax 
inducements? Most people would agree that regressivity is a serious 
mark against a fiscal system taken in its entirety. But it is less obvious 
that regressivity of a component part of a fiscal system is such a 
damning objection. One could argue that these inducements are 
largely aimed at higher income individuals who, as a result of 
behavioural failings to be discussed in the next section, have 
difficulty putting aside enough for their retirement, and are thus 
likely to suffer significant drops in their living standards given the 
austerity of the state pension. To see this, suppose that these 
inducements were not initially present and are now introduced. 
Suppose further that they are paid for by having a higher top 
marginal income tax rate. In that case, the full burden of paying for 
the inducements falls on higher earners. The combined effect of the 
inducements (which partly go to those on the standard rate) and the 
means of paying for them (a higher top rate) is actually progressive. 
In reality, it is of course hard to determine where the burden of 
paying for the inducements actually falls. But to the extent that tax-
favoured savings instruments are meeting an important need for 
higher earners – and are paid for by higher earners – they need not 
be objectionable on equity grounds.   
What need do these tax-favoured instruments meet? One 
possibility is that they increase the after-tax return to saving and thus 
increase the amount people save. However, the international 
evidence generally shows savings is quite insensitive to the after-tax 
return (see Bernheim (1997), for an excellent survey). A more 
important rationale is probably that they help people overcome the 
behavioural dispositions that make it difficult to save for retirements 
that seem a long way off (again see Bernheim, (1997)). One way they 
might do this is by encouraging people to put their savings on 
autopilot to avail of the tax breaks period by period; a second benefit 
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is that they help people put their retirement funds off limit for 
current consumption by imposing large tax penalties for early 
withdrawal. The next section will review important lessons from 
recent behavioural economics research in more detail. First, 
however, I review one tax-favoured savings instrument that, though 
still very new, has not proved popular with savers.  
3.2 PERSONAL RETIREMENT SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 
Introduced in 2003, PRSAs were designed to make well-regulated, 
tax-favoured retirement savings products broadly available to a 
dynamic workforce. The accounts are portable, thus allowing 
individuals to continue to build retirement wealth as they move from 
job to job, between from paid employment and self employment, or 
between employment and non-employment. Maximum tax free 
contributions rise from 15 per cent of non-pensionable earnings for 
those under 30 years, to 30 per cent for those aged 50 years and 
above. Employer contributions are aggregated with employee 
contributions in determining the maximum tax-free contributions. 
At the withdrawal phase, one-quarter of benefits can be taken tax 
free, with further withdrawals subject to income tax at the 
individual’s marginal rate. Benefits can be taken after age 60 years 
and must commence before age 75 years. Restrictions on 
withdrawals apply for those without an annuity income of a least 
€12,700 per year.18 At death, the remaining funds pass to the 
person’s estate and are subject to normal inheritance taxation.  In 
terms of product choice, PRSA offerings can come in both standard 
and non-standard varieties. Standard PRSAs are limited to a 
restricted range of investment instruments and are subject to 
maximum charges. Employers without an occupational pension 
scheme or with waiting periods to join the scheme are required to 
designate at least one PRSA provider.  
Although still relatively new, PRSAs appear to have gotten off to 
a slow start. The negligible increase in overall private pension 
coverage from 51.2 per cent in the first quarter of 2002 to 52.4 per 
cent in the first quarter of 2004 represents limited progress toward 
the Pensions Board’s goal of 70 per cent by 2006. Only 50,000 
accounts had been opened by May of 2005. Part of the reason may 
be that even the standard accounts with their regulated charges do 
not seem particularly good value. A review of the charges charged by 
the companies offering the accounts shows that they tend to set their 
charges at the maximum levels – 5 per cent of initial contributions 
and an on-going 1 per cent of assets under management. These 
charges will substantially erode fund accumulation over time. But 
possibly more important than the direct cost is the fact that 
18 €63,500 must be used to purchase an annuity or this amount must be kept in the 
PRSA until age 75 years. Alternatively, the value of the assets in the PRSA can be 
transferred to an Approved Retirement Fund (ARF). But again €63,500 must be 
used to purchase an annuity or kept in an Approved Minimum Retirement Fund 
(AMRF) until age 75 years.  
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employers and employees find the setting up of the accounts to be 
onerous, contributing to the already substantial inertia that prevent 
people from getting their savings plans off the ground. I next turn to 
work in behavioural economics that helps us understand this inertia 
and other saving-impeding dispositions.  
 
 Economists are increasingly concluding that the rational choice 
model of savings (as embodied in the life cycle model, say) does a 
poor job in explaining actual savings behaviour. As a result of this 
work, there is good reason to believe that public policy towards 
retirement savings that does not allow for human foibles is likely to 
produce less than ideal results.19 This section will just touch on some 
of the lessons from recent behavioural research that bear on the 
design of savings policies. The next two sections then apply these 
lessons, first to the success of the SSIA scheme, and then to a 
proposal for a significant new state-sponsored savings instrument.  
4. 
Selected 
Lessons 
Learned From 
Behavioural 
Economics 
Research
LESSON 1: WE EXHIBIT A PRESENT BIAS IN OUR 
CONSUMPTION DECISIONS 
Many of us are saving less for our retirements than we know we 
should. To fix ideas, suppose we are weighing the value of an extra 
euro’s worth of consumption 10 years from now compared with an 
extra euro’s worth 15 years from now. Both dates are sufficiently far 
off that we can be reasonably impartial between the two. Now fast 
forward 10 years so that the first date is now. The value of additional 
consumption today relative to 5 years from now is likely to be higher 
than the perceived relative value from the perspective of 10 years 
back. The problem is that we tend to be highly partial to the present 
– we like instant gratification – leading to what economists call inter-
temporally inconsistent (or hyperbolic) preferences. This is what 
leads us to put aside less of our income for retirement than we know 
(at least in our more detached moments) we should.  Laibson et al. 
(1998, p. 95) point to the negative consequences of the lure of 
instant gratification as well as to means for strengthening one’s self 
control: 
[H]yperbolic consumers will report a gap between what 
they feel they should save and what they actually do save. 
Normative saving rates will lie above actual saving rates, 
since short-run preferences for instantaneous gratification 
will undermine a consumer’s effort to implement long-run 
19 Richard Thaler tells a story (where I cannot remember) of a conference where he 
noted that the difference between himself and Robert Barro – who works very 
much within the rationale choice paradigm – is that he (Thaler) thinks everyone else 
is as dumb as he is, whereas Barro thinks everyone is as smart as he is. Robert Barro 
purportedly agreed with this assessment. In emphasising behavioural failings, I too 
run the risk of generalising too much based on introspection. The evidence from 
the behavioural literature gives me some small confidence that I am not entirely 
alone.  
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optimal plans. However, the hyperbolic consumer is not 
doomed to be an underachiever. Commitment devices such 
as pensions and illiquid assets can help the hyperbolic 
consumer commit to the patient, welfare enhancing course 
of action. The availability of illiquid assets is thus a critical 
determinant of national savings rates, as well as of 
consumer welfare.  
LESSON 2: WE PROCRASTINATE IN TAKING 
POSTPONABLE ACTIONS THAT REQUIRE UP-FRONT 
EFFORT 
The tendency to procrastinate is really a special form of present bias 
where we must incur some up-front effort – say going to the trouble 
of opening up an investment account – to secure an important 
benefit in the future. Many of us procrastinate when we have the 
option of postponing a burdensome action – say writing a paper – 
until tomorrow, especially where the costs of a short delay are small. 
After all, why do today what you can just as well do tomorrow? The 
problem is that when we have ongoing opportunities for delay we 
continue to take them.  And the small per-period costs of delay can 
then add up to a big cost; such as when the editors turn out to be 
surprisingly insistent on the paper’s deadline, or – more seriously –
reaching retirement and realising that you have saved so little that 
you cannot sustain anything close to your old standard of living.  
Choi et al. (2001) provide intriguing evidence that individuals 
choosing savings plans tend to follow the “path of least resistance”–
that is, they do what requires the least amount of current effort. In 
most cases, the least-effort action involves doing nothing at all, what 
they call the “passive decision.” They find that the nature of the 
default – what will happen if no active choice is made – significantly 
impacts the actual “choice” that is made. In their study, participation 
in a tax-preferred saving plan was significantly higher when the 
default was automatic enrolment. This raises the possibility that the 
damage done by procrastination can be lessened – or procrastination 
can even be turned into a positive force offsetting other broader 
present biases – by an appropriate choice of default.20  
 
20 A possible drawback of active defaults is that the individual would have gotten 
around to participating eventually. And when they finally do participate, they will 
choose the optimal form of participation in terms of such parameters as 
contribution rates and asset allocation. The danger with the enrolment default is 
that the procrastinating participant considers it good enough, and never gets around 
to choosing their optimal parameters. Choi et al. (2005) consider an alternative to 
defaults called active decisions. In this case, the individual is forced to make a 
choice by some specified date, with one of the available choices being “no 
participation.” In the context of their model, they show that active decisions are 
likely to be best where individuals have a strong propensity to procrastinate and 
savings preferences are highly heterogeneous.  
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LESSON 3: WE ARE SENSITIVE TO THE WAY OPTIONS 
ARE FRAMED 
Rational decision makers should not be affected by inconsequential 
details of how options are framed. In fact, many experimental 
studies have shown that actual decisions can be quite sensitive to 
details economists would typically view as inconsequential.  
Consider the following hypothetical example: Mr. A earns €100, 
faces an income tax rate of 20 per cent, and earns a zero per cent real 
interest rate on any savings. The government gives him the following 
option: Save €20 from his after tax income of €80 and receive a 
government match of 25 per cent. This allows him to have €60 
worth of consumption today and €25 of additional consumption in 
the future. This compares with a status quo €80 today and €0 in the 
future when the policy is not chosen. Now consider an alternative 
option offered by the government: Save €25 from pre-tax income 
and receive tax relief on the saved income. This again allows him to 
€60 worth of consumption today and €25 of additional consumption 
in the future. Once again the status quo is €80 today and €0 in the 
future. So both policies have the same monetary consequences for 
Mr. A. If he would take advantage of the first policy when it is the 
one on offer, then he should also take advantage of the second 
policy if it were offered in its place.  
Clearly, the two options – though monetarily equivalent – are 
framed differently.  In the first case, Mr. A has to save €20 and then 
gets €5 added to his savings account for free by the government. In 
the second case, Mr. A gets to avoid income tax on €25 of his 
income if he allocates it to saving. As noted above, numerous 
behavioural experiments have shown that decisions can be strongly 
affected by the way they are framed. In our example, an individual 
facing the first option might experience some pain from the €20 of 
saving, but feel quite good about getting the windfall of €5 (even 
though it cannot be consumed until later). For the second option, 
the saving-related sacrifice might seem greater given the need to save 
€25 up front, and the feeling of gain from the tax relief might be 
muted by a sense that it was their own money in the first place. The 
point of this example is not proven that an individual will view these 
options differently – most of us would claim to be too smart to be 
so confused – but rather to raise the possibility in the reader’s mind 
that there are people out there who would be sensitive to such 
framing.  
LESSON 4: OUR INCOME IS NOT FUNGIBLE DUE TO 
THE EXERCISE OF MENTAL ACCOUNTING 
In the life-cycle model, the propensity to consume out of a given 
increase in income should not depend on the source of that income. 
For instance, a €100 bonus at work should be treated the same as a 
€100 capital gain on your stock portfolio. That is, income is 
supposed to be fungible. In a series of papers, Richard Thaler has 
emphasised the tendency for people to allocate their funds to 
different mental accounts. Dedicated accounts are established for 
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particular purposes. The implications of a given income gain or loss 
for consumption behaviour will then depend on which account that 
income is in. If the stock portfolio is set aside as a retirement fund, 
then a capital gain will mean more funds for retirement.  
Thaler (1999, p. 196) points to the relevance of such mental 
accounting for the design of savings policies. 
A powerful prediction of the mental accounting model is 
that if funds can be transferred to less tempting mental 
accounts they are more likely to be saved. This insight can be 
used in designing government programmes that are used to 
stimulate saving. According to the behavioural lifecycle 
model, if households can be persuaded to move some of 
their funds from the current income account to future 
income accounts, long-term saving will increase… My 
reading of the literature on this topic is that this prediction is 
borne out. Households who contribute to retirement savings 
plans display steady increases in the funds in these accounts 
with no apparent reduction in the funds in other accounts. 
That is, they save more.   
LESSON 5: OUR SAVINGS DECISIONS ARE SUSCEPTIBLE 
TO SOCIAL INFLUENCES 
The decision maker in the rational choice model tends to make 
his/her choice in splendid isolation. Decision makers in the real 
world may be influenced by what other people are doing. In 
particular, saving levels within a social group may be “strategic 
complements” – I want to save more if you are saving more and vice 
versa. One reason for such behaviour might be that neither of us 
wants to be struggling while the Joneses next door are enjoying a 
comfy retirement. Another is that it is easier to keep up with the 
Joneses now, if the Joneses are socking it away for retirement.21  
Suggestive evidence on the power of social influence is provided 
by Duflo and Saez (2003). They conduct an experiment whereby 
they provide a small financial incentive to selected employees from 
selected departments in a certain organisation to attend an 
informational session on tax-deferred savings plans, finding that 
attending the session does increase participation in these plans. 
Interestingly, participation increased just as much for non-attendees 
in the selected departments. This suggests a strong social interaction 
effect, whereby the knowledge and/or example of peers has 
significant effects on saving behaviour.   
21 Such other-referencing behaviour can lead to social multipliers, whereby an 
exogenous increase in one household’s savings can set off a cycle of increasing 
saving rates until saving rates settle back into a new (higher) equilibrium. When 
saving decisions are strategic complements, there is also the possibility of having 
both a low saving equilibrium where everyone saves little given that everyone is 
saving little and a high saving equilibrium where everyone saves a lot because 
everyone is saving a lot.  
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Thaler and Benartzi (2004) describe a real world programme 
called Save More Tomorrow™ (or SMarT) with a design that is 
rooted in the lessons of behavioural economics research. The plan 
has four ingredients. First, potential participants are approached 
about increasing their contributions well ahead of the time those 
increases would take effect. This increases the chance that employees 
make their decision in a more temporally neutral way. Second, the 
increases are timed to coincide with scheduled pay increases, 
minimising the chance that the employees perceive the increased 
contribution as a loss. Third, the contribution rate continues to rise 
with scheduled pay increases until it reaches a preset maximum, 
where it is hoped that inertia will keep people in the plan despite the 
rising current sacrifice. Fourth, employees are allowed to opt out of 
the plan at any time. Although the plan is still quite new, early results 
indicate that it has been successful in increasing saving. Significant 
majorities of those offered the SMarT plan chose to join, and most 
stayed with the plan over successive contribution increases. Most 
important, participants have on average quadrupled their saving 
rates. I will later draw on elements of the SMarT program design in 
suggesting a new government-backed saving programme. First, 
however, I turn to the example of an existing government savings 
policy that seems especially well-designed to counteract behavioural 
obstacles to more rational savings choices.  
 
 The SSIA scheme opened on May 1, 2001 and closed for new 
subscribers on April 30, 2002. Under the scheme, individuals can 
contribute up to €254 a month to accounts operated by a large 
number of registered managers for a period of five years. The 
sweetener is a combination of a 25 per cent government match on all 
contributions and a 23 per cent exit tax that is levied only on the 
accumulated investment profits. However, all withdrawals made 
before the 5-year term is up are subject to the exit tax on principal 
and interest. The scheme was introduced to counter the perceived 
under-saving of Irish households. It is interesting to note that it was 
introduced at a time of significant budget surpluses, an overheating 
economy and strains in social partnership due to the erosion of wage 
gains by inflation. The scheme was thus seen as being fiscally 
affordable, macroeconomically justified, and a means of shoring up 
the partnership deal.   
5. 
Special Savings 
Incentive 
Accounts
It is fair to say that the popularity of the SSIAs has taken most 
observers by surprise. Based on analysis by the Revenue 
Commissioners, the Department of Finance (2005) reports there 
were 1,170,208 subscribers on the closing date for entries on April 
30, 2002, and 1,094,294 members were still in the scheme at the end 
of 2004. Total contributions were almost €2.3 billion in 2004, with a 
net cost to the government (netting out taxes on early withdrawals) 
in 2004 of €548 million. The average monthly subscription was €175 
in December 2004, with close to 44 per cent of subscribers 
contributing the maximum monthly amount. Interestingly, 28 per 
cent of subscribers had incomes below €20,000, showing that the 
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scheme was certainly not just availed of by the better off. Moreover, 
a survey of subscribers by the Bank of Ireland found that 76 per cent 
of SSIA accounts were held by first-time savers, so it seems 
reasonable to assume that much of the money put into the SSIAs is 
indeed new saving.  
Why has the SSIA scheme been so successful? I think that our 
review of selected lessons from behavioural economics research 
shows how a number of the scheme’s features were well-designed to 
help people make the difficult decision to sacrifice current 
consumption.  
• Overcoming present bias. Although people were free to 
reduce or even eliminate contributions once they had jointed 
the scheme, the scheme’s design – and especially its month-
by-month based limits – encouraged people to make advance 
commitments to automatically contribute fixed monthly 
amounts to their accounts. This allowed for more “temporally 
neutral” decisions about how much to save. It is also likely 
that by giving the scheme a medium-term focus, subscribers 
were better able to imagine the benefits of their saving, 
thereby providing some counterforce to their bias towards 
present consumption. The relative lack of interest in PRSAs 
despite their generous tax treatment suggests the retirement 
consumption does not have quite the same lure.22  
• Overcoming procrastination. The April 30, 2002 deadline for 
new subscribers appears to have been a master stroke in 
getting people to shake off the inertia that stops them putting 
their saving plan in place. The deadline meant that eventually 
there was “no tomorrow” for those who wanted to avail of 
the free government money. If one needs any confirmation 
that many of us wait until the last minute to do unpleasant 
tasks, then Figure 4 should be it. The figure shows that as 
many people signed up for the SSIA scheme in April 2002 as 
signed up in the entire preceding 11 months that 
subscriptions were open.  
• Effective framing. In Section 4, I pointed to the equivalence 
for taxpayers of giving tax relief at the standard income tax 
rate of 20 per cent for contributions to a scheme such as 
SSIAs and the 25 per cent government subsidy. But the two 
do not sound the same. Although a careful experimental study 
would be needed to prove people perceive the two offers 
differently, my guess is that framed as a 25 per cent subsidy 
from the government, the SSIAs were perceived as an 
especially good deal.  
 
22 In this regard, it is interesting that an age analysis of SSIA subscribers in 2004 
shows that 43 per cent were under the age of 40 years.  
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Figure 4: Number of SSIAs on December 2004 by Month of Commencement 
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• Establishing mental accounts. As noted above, survey 
evidence suggests that a significant majority of account 
holders are first-time savers. Work on mental accounting 
suggests many people cordon off certain monies for particular 
purposes using various devices. Such cordoning off for saving 
is certainly facilitated by having real world accounts that can 
only be “raided” for other purposes at high cost – a large tax 
penalty in the case of the SSIAs. 
• Social reinforcement. In the early days of the scheme, I recall 
asking a few people if they had signed up for the scheme. The 
answer was always that they would be stupid not to. With a 25 
per cent subsidy on offer, it is hard to disagree. But it is likely 
that the fear of feeling stupid was heightened by the fact that 
so many others were signing up (not to mention the fact that 
experts were saying the accounts were a great deal). The 
spouse with responsibility for household finances would have 
some explaining to do if the Joneses next door were seen 
building up a nice government-sponsored nest egg, but their 
   PERSPECTIVES  ON  RETIREMENT  SAVING  POLICIES  IN  IRELAND 39 
 
 
family’s financial wizard could not get their act together to set 
up an account in time.  
With the first accounts set to mature in May 2006, there is not 
surprisingly considerable interest in a successor to the scheme. One 
concern is the maturation of accounts worth a total of €14-€15 
billion will cause a disruptive overheating of the economy. These 
fears are given some credence by surveys that suggest many people 
are planning significant consumption sprees.  
A related concern is that people will lose the savings habit. I 
think that there is a very real danger that this will happen since the 
current savings are supported by a very particular institutional 
mechanism. If the accounts were closed and the direct deposit 
facilities cancelled, there is a danger that many people will simply 
revert to consuming the funds that they had been contributing to 
SSIAs. For many contributors, it is probably true that there is no real 
savings “habit,” just a mechanism working in the background that 
transfers funds to their SSIA accounts on a monthly basis. Take the 
mechanism away, and the saving will end.  
The behavioural economics literature suggests ways to minimise 
the savings loss from the end of the scheme. At a minimum, it seems 
wise to get rid of the current bureaucratic requirement to make a 
maturity declaration at the end of the scheme. The declaration has 
the understandable intent to make sure that people have kept to the 
terms of the scheme – e.g., that they did not pledge the assets as 
security for a loan; but whatever benefit comes from such a 
declaration, it is likely to be outweighed by the cost of interfering 
with the inertia that will keep many people contributing to their 
account even after the formal scheme ends.23 This inertial effect is 
likely to be quite strong, since accounts can continue exactly as 
before, just without the government match.  
Another sensible proposal is to allow people to transfer their 
accumulated funds to a PRSA without tax liability. The fiscal loss to 
the government is likely to be quite small, since the 23 per cent tax 
only applies on the investment returns. By one calculation, the tax 
liability on a deposit-based SSIA paying 4 per cent interest over the 
full 5-year term with maximum monthly contributions is €440, or 
just 2 per cent of the account’s value.24   
There have also been proposals for a more formal successor to 
the scheme. One interesting proposal has come from the Irish 
Association of Investment Managers (IAIM – admittedly not a 
wholly disinterested party. They propose what they call a ‘Lifetime 
Flexi Investment Account’. This product is designed as a retirement 
savings vehicle and it attracts a government subsidy on up to €250 of 
contributions (to be indexed to either wage or price inflation). Those 
23 Requiring this declaration reminds me a bit of a strategy used by an old school 
master of mine when he could not identify the culprit of some misdeed. He would 
ask everyone in the class if they were the culprit; and he seemed to get great 
satisfaction out of the fact he had made a liar out of one of us.  
24 See Irish Association of Investment Mangers (2005).  
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outside the tax net would receive the subsidy equal to 20 per cent of 
their contributions. Taxpayers would receive tax relief at the 
standard rate (presumably in addition to the tax relief that they are 
entitled to on other pension-related saving.) Every 5 years 
contributors would have access to 30 per cent of the previous 5 
years’ contributions subject to a 23 per cent exit tax.  
While I see merit in trying to help people avail of their SSIAs for 
retirement provision, I think it is also worth exploring other 
government policies that are more specifically focused on this goal. I 
describe one possible instrument in the next section. My aim is to 
find an instrument that is “behaviourally realistic” in the sense that it 
recognises the difficulties we face with voluntary retirement saving, 
while at the same time avoids having the government compel people 
to save. 
 
 
6.1 BASIC DESIGN 
6. 
Universal 
Retirement 
Savings 
Accounts
The proposal involves the establishment of a new type of account, 
tentatively called a Universal Retirement Savings Account (URSA or 
Your Savings Account). The accounts would be available to all adults 
with a Personal Public Service (PPS) number, and individuals would 
have full control over the size of their contributions and some 
control over their asset allocations. In what follows, I do not try to 
describe a fully worked out plan, but rather sketch the elements that 
I think a workable plan might include.  
A key element of the proposal is that, like the SMarT program, 
there is a default contribution rate and a low-cost default investment vehicle for 
individuals subject to withholding. In other words, unless these 
individuals opt to do otherwise, there would be automatic 
investment of a given fraction of gross earnings into a default 
investment vehicle. To be more concrete, 3 per cent of gross 
earnings is sent to their account via direct withholding. Importantly, 
individuals have the opportunity to change their contribution rates – 
including the option of contributing nothing – at regular intervals 
(say once a year). Opting out would require some paperwork on the 
part of the saver. The default contribution rate would rise by 0.5 
percentage points a year, so that it reaches 6 per cent after 6 years. 
Individuals not subject to withholding would be free to contribute to 
their accounts in whatever amounts they wish. These contributions 
could be made by direct deposit.  
In the first year, the government provides a 25 per cent match on 
contributions up to €254 a month. This is obviously designed to 
replicate the SSIA accounts. The size of the government match 
could be scaled back over time and possibly phased out altogether to 
limit the fiscal cost.  
The default investment is a low- (or even zero-) cost investment 
product linked to the NPRF. Individuals are free to withdraw their 
funds and place them in an approved PRSA account (possibly 
extended to other approved retirement investment vehicles). 
Amounts transferred to PRSA accounts would not be counted 
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against the normal limits on tax-favoured contributions. All other 
withdrawals are subject to an exit tax of 20 per cent (which 
effectively claws back the government match plus interest).25 
6.2 WHY THESE ACCOUNTS WOULD RAISE SAVING 
The accounts are designed with the lessons of behavioural 
economics and the success of the SSIAs in mind.  
• Present bias and procrastination. The accounts would pit one 
aspect of the self control problem – i.e., the desire for instant 
gratification – against another – the tendency to procrastinate 
when engaging in presently costly actions such as the hassle 
of changing the default. The evidence from the SMarT 
programme shows that inertia can win out over the lure of 
greater current consumption, so that a well-chosen default 
can move people closer to their optimal savings rate. This 
effect could be reinforced setting an advance deadline for 
changing the default for the coming year. When forced to 
choose in advance, present-biased individuals will tend to be 
less biased towards sooner over later gratification.   
• Framing and mental accounts. By initially adopting the 
matching feature of the SSIA, the accounts would be framed 
as being “SSIA-like.” This suggests a double advantage: the 
framing of the matching rule for the SSIAs has already been 
shown to be effective; and the new accounts gain by 
association with the popular SSIA scheme. Moreover, by 
clearly labelling the accounts as being for retirement and by 
imposing a penalty for early withdrawal – i.e., the loss of the 
government match – the design helps individuals mentally 
cordon off the accounts as being for retirement.  
• Social multipliers. The experience of the PRSAs shows the 
difficulty of building participation in purely voluntary 
accounts. The proposed accounts are likely to start off with a 
relatively high level of participation simply because the 
default is to contribute. To the extent the individuals are 
more likely to want to contribute when others do likewise, 
high participation is likely to be self reinforcing, so that there 
is a greater chance of settling into a high participation 
equilibrium.  
6.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE SCHEME 
Although I believe the plan is likely to achieve higher saving without 
resorting to government compulsion, it is not without drawbacks. 
First, some procrastinating individuals who would eventually have 
25 The size of the exit tax should fall over time based on how the government scales 
back its matching rate.  
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gotten around to setting up a retirement saving plan are likely to 
view the default as “good enough.” Thus, although the default may 
get them to start saving earlier, the default plan may induce them to 
stick with a non-optimal savings plan for longer than they otherwise 
would.  
Second, the plan places additional administrative and fiscal 
burden on the government. The design of the plan attempts to 
minimise this burden by tying the contribution mechanism to the 
current withholding system, piggy-backing on the NPRF for asset 
management, and allowing for a phase-down of the government 
match. I have not attempted to cost any of this, but the overall 
burden is clearly substantial. 
Third, the plan is likely to be opposed by several vested interests. 
As outlined, the plan minimises the involvement of the private 
financial sector, although it is possible to increase their role by 
allowing for a greater range of eligible investment options. It is easy 
to imagine the plan also being opposed by the NTMA, who might 
plausibly fear the complexity and political ramifications of being 
responsible to millions of small account holders. (Note, however, 
that the management of the accounts could be separated from the 
management of the fund.) 
Fourth, and related to the previous point, the accounts run the 
risk of politicising the investment strategy for the NPRF. At present, 
the fund appears to be well insulated from political pressures, but 
this could change if people’s wealth was directly tied to its 
performance.26  
Fifth, tying both the pre-funding of state pensions and the 
default accounts to the performance of the NPRF makes retirement 
income overly dependent on the performance of a specific asset 
portfolio. Poor performance of the NPRF would increase both the 
political risk of lower state-pension benefits at the same time that the 
NPRF-linked investment accounts yielding poor returns.  One way 
around this problem is to establish a separate fund for the default 
URSAs that is relatively uncorrelated with the NPRF.   
This list of problems shows that URSAs would be a complex 
administrative and political undertaking. But I think the potential for 
helping households deal with their under-saving without resorting to 
one-size-fits-all compulsion makes them worth considering.  
6.4 LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 
Believing that individuals are usually the best judge of their own 
interests, economists are usually loath to advocate paternalistic 
policies to protect people from their own bad decisions. When it 
comes to retirement saving decisions, however, the findings of 
behavioural economics show that our partiality to present 
consumption often trumps the savings plans that we recognise as 
26 On the positive side, tying individual wealth to the performance of the fund 
should be a counterweight to pressures for more domestic or socially responsible 
investments.  
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desirable in our more impartial moments. Recently, a number of 
authors have explored the merits of a light-handed paternalism that 
would help people avoid the often severe costs of our behavioural 
failings, while still leaving the fullest possible menu of choices for 
those who might want to exercise them. I think that the proposed 
URSAs with default contributions fit this bill. The accounts should 
help under-savers come closer to their own optimal retirement 
savings plans, while imposing little constraint on those who want to 
make their own choices about how much to save and in what form 
they want to hold their savings.  
This type of policy has been labelled “libertarian paternalism” by 
Thaler and Sunstein (2003). With regard to the URSAs, the 
libertarian part is the complete freedom to override the default. The 
paternalism part recognises that the choice of default matters for 
saving behaviour – and this includes today’s default of no 
contribution – and responsible governments have a duty to 
recognise this when they design savings policy. Camerer et al. (2003) 
use the term “asymmetric paternalism” in defending a similar idea.27 
Again in the specific context of the URSAs, the asymmetry would be 
in the likely large benefits for those who are now saving far too little 
to sustain their living standard in retirement, while imposing small 
costs on those wishing to opt-out of the programme because they do 
not need or desire the policy help. 
Under current policies, it is doubtful that the government will 
reach its private pension coverage target of 70 per cent for some 
years. This is likely to lead to serious consideration of a mandatory 
coverage plan. Mandatory coverage is not without merit where the 
alternative is a significant number of households experiencing 
substantial falls in their living standards at retirement. But it certainly 
is a blunt instrument. As reviewed in this paper, retirement saving 
innovations by paternalistic employers in the private sector may 
point the way for alternative public policy approaches that better 
balance the need to achieve retirement income adequacy and desire 
to preserve freedom of choice.  
 
 Retirement income provision is often referred to as a “three-
legged stool”, with retirees receiving support from state benefits 
(cash and non-cash), employer-sponsored pensions, and voluntary 
private savings. This paper has reviewed recent policy efforts to 
shore up the various legs. I have argued that the National Pensions 
7. 
Concluding 
Comments 
27 Camerer et al. (2003, p. 1212) describe what they mean by asymmetric paternalism 
as follows:  
Our purpose in this Article is to argue that in many cases it is possible to have 
one’s cake and eat it too. We propose an approach to evaluating paternalistic 
regulations and doctrines that we call “asymmetric paternalism.” A regulation is 
asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large benefits for those who make errors 
while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational. Such regulations 
are relatively harmless to those who reliably make decisions in their best interest, 
while at the same time advantageous to those making suboptimal choices.  
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Reserve Fund helps secure existing levels of pension generosity for 
current and future generations of workers in the face of anticipated 
population ageing. It also increases the scope for prudent, forward-
looking governments to provide needed increases in pension 
generosity for current retirees despite the high long-term cost of 
such commitments. Turning to tax-favoured saving vehicles, I 
argued that, while well-designed tax inducements for regular 
retirement saving can help people get closer to their own desired 
saving targets, the recently introduced Personal Retirement Savings 
Accounts seem poorly designed from a behavioural perspective. In 
contrast, the success of the Special Savings Incentive Accounts 
shows the potential for a well-designed package of savings 
inducements to help overcome the lure of instant gratification. 
Finally, I outlined the broad elements of a proposal called Universal 
Retirements Savings Accounts that incorporate key lessons from 
behavioural economics and the success of the SSIAs. The central 
idea is to make retirement saving the default option, but to preserve 
maximum freedom of choice for a diverse population with different 
preferences and needs. Experimental research from the private 
sector has shown this to be effective in moving savings rates closer 
to desired levels. Although there are a number of ways this basic idea 
could be implemented, I have sketched an approach that leverages 
the current tax-withholding system and low-cost asset management 
through the NTMA. I believe the broad approach would yield 
substantial increases lifetime welfare for many households, while not 
forcing more saving on those who do not want or need the policy 
help. 
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TAX  EXPENDITURES 
Tim Callan, John Walsh, Kieran Coleman 
 During the run-up to Budget 2005 considerable attention was 
focused on the operation of certain tax reliefs. Particular attention 
centred on the fact that the some high earners had used property-
based reliefs to reduce, or in some cases eliminate, their tax liabilities 
(Revenue Commissioners, 2002). A review of property-based and 
area-based tax reliefs was announced by the Minister for Finance in 
Budget 2005 and is currently under way. In this paper we take a 
broader look at tax reliefs and exemptions, and draw on some 
international evidence as to how best to assess and review such 
measures on an ongoing basis.  
1. 
Introduction
One aspect of the review of selected tax expenditures is that 
mechanisms to ensure that all taxpayers pay some minimum 
contribution are to be considered. For this reason we review the US 
experience with a minimum income tax, and consider whether an 
approach based on a minimum tax is the best way to deal with the 
problems associated with intensive use of tax expenditure schemes 
by high income taxpayers. 
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 The term “tax expenditure” is designed to draw attention to the 
fact that tax reliefs aiming to favour particular industries, activities or 
classes of persons have close parallels with explicit expenditures 
designed to achieve the same goals.1 Tax expenditures can only be 
defined and measured against a background of a “normal” or 
“undistorted” tax structure which has no such special features. The 
question of which aspects of a tax system form part of this “normal” 
structure, and which represent special departures, to be treated as tax 
expenditures, can be contentious. Nevertheless, the tax expenditure 
concept has been applied in a range of countries. A key concern of 
this approach is to ensure that the standards by which tax 
expenditures and direct government expenditures are evaluated, 
both ex ante and ex post, are consistent. Tax expenditure analysis is 
also used to ensure that what Howard (1997) terms the “hidden 
welfare state” receives equal prominence in public debate on policy 
choices with direct expenditure. 
2. 
 Tax Reliefs 
Versus Direct 
Expenditures
1 For the origins of the terms see Surrey and McDaniel (1985) and Burman (2003). 
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For individual items, there can be specific factors making a tax 
relief or a direct expenditure more efficient (e.g., income support for 
low income families provided via direct transfers may be associated 
with lower take-up of the benefit than under a tax credit system).2 
Here we focus on a few more general factors which distinguish tax 
reliefs from expenditures. Typically, expenditure proposals arise 
from line departments, but for proposals to succeed they must pass 
tests set by the finance department. This may also be the case for 
some tax expenditure proposals; but the costs involved are often a 
good deal more uncertain. Other tax expenditures fall within the 
remit of the finance department (e.g., the treatment of savings) and 
therefore do not get the element of “cross-departmental” 
examination which is inherent in the expenditure area. 
Expenditures have to be voted on regularly, as money is 
provided through the estimates for the services and subsidies 
involved. While some tax reliefs are time limited, most are not, so 
that tax expenditures roll on from one year to the next without an 
automatic opportunity for re-examination. Expenditure programmes 
are highly visible and subject to audit and review. Tax expenditures 
are less visible and transparent. 
There has been official recognition of such arguments in recent 
years. The Comptroller and Auditor General (2001) concluded that 
“… the scope of the Expenditure Review Initiative should also be 
broadened to include tax expenditures”. The Department of Finance 
(2002) report for the Tax Strategy Group indicated a need to 
examine existing and potential new tax incentives/expenditures in 
terms of value-for-money. The need for better data, the possibility 
of using time limits, and making renewal subject to  a case by case 
examination were all mentioned.  
The second report of the Commission on Taxation (1984) 
examined tax incentive schemes then in place, and some possible 
new incentives. In most cases they recommended that the reliefs be 
abolished, or that new reliefs not be introduced. They stated that  
 
This should not be interpreted as implying that we are unsympathetic to 
the activities which such incentives would encourage. In considering the 
introduction of such an incentive, it is not sufficient to show that the 
activity at which the incentive is directed is worthy and would benefit. If 
this criterion were accepted to justify incentives, virtually all items would 
qualify for incentives. This is because there is almost no activity which 
cannot be shown to benefit from a selective reduction in taxation.....In 
considering the introduction of incentives for one sector, account must be 
taken of the disincentive effects on other sectors which bear the cost. 
Incentives must be provided on a limited basis for priority areas. 
The key areas identified by the Commission were tax incentives  
• to correct market failure;  
• to attract desirable internationally mobile capital investment;  
 
2 Recent findings regarding overpayment of tax credits suggest that there are 
countervailing factors in terms of administrative effectiveness. 
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• and as a “second-best” option to offset shortcomings in 
other policy areas. 
In terms of the mode of intervention, the Commission 
concluded that “Though there is no definitive argument for or 
against tax-based incentives, we have concluded that direct aids are 
more likely to be cost-effective than tax reliefs. They also have the 
merit of greater flexibility and can be applied more selectively”. 
A parallel argument was made by Corden (1984) concerning 
trade policy: the guiding principle should be to intervene to offset a 
distortion, with the intervention coming as close to the point of the 
distortion as possible. In this context, the default policy option 
should be a subsidy – so a policymaker would need to examine first 
the need for any intervention, and second, consider whether there 
were any compelling reasons to depart from a subsidy. In the same 
way it can be helpful to think of tax expenditures as if they were 
ordinary expenditures, to be financed by other tax revenues. This 
points up the need to ask whether direct expenditures might not 
achieve the objectives of the (proposed) tax expenditure in a more 
effective and/or efficient manner. 
 
 The Revenue Commissioners regularly produce estimates of the 
costs of various tax reliefs and exemptions, using the “revenue 
foregone” approach. This asks how much higher tax liabilities would 
be if the tax reliefs did not exist and taxpayers made no change in 
their behaviour. This can be contrasted with a “revenue gain” 
approach (Brixi et al., 2003) which seeks to identify the increase in 
revenue that could be expected if a particular tax concession were 
abolished. The revenue gain approach requires estimates of the 
behavioural responses to the abolition of the relief. Given the range 
and diversity of expenditures qualifying for tax relief, empirical 
estimation of the responsiveness of relevant behaviours and 
decisions to the tax reliefs offered involves many and different 
challenges. But in the absence of solid empirical evidence on these 
issues, decisions regarding the institution or continuation of reliefs 
have to be made on a less than satisfactory basis. 
3. 
Tax 
Expenditures: 
How Much Do 
They Cost?
One example of the difference between these approaches is in 
the costing of the exemption of interest on national savings schemes 
(Savings Certificates and Bonds and National Instalment Savings). 
The revenue foregone approach indicates a cost in the order of  
€100 million for this relief. But this exemption allows the state to 
obtain funds at a lower rate of interest than would otherwise be 
possible. If the relief were abolished, few could be expected to invest 
in these schemes at the interest rates currently in force – these are at 
a discount to more general interest rates precisely because of the 
relief. Thus, either the state would see little or no revenue gain from 
abolishing the relief, or the gain would be offset by the need to raise 
the interest rate offered to compete with rates generally available. 
An accurate comparison of the aggregate values of tax reliefs and  
direct expenditures requires a further adjustment: the question asked 
in this context is how much direct expenditure, in pre-tax terms, 
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would be required to achieve the same net-of-tax impact if a tax 
expenditure were to be replaced by a direct expenditure. This 
“outlay equivalent” approach is needed if the scale and cost of tax 
expenditures is to be measured on the same scale as direct 
expenditures. For example, if a tax expenditure increases disposable 
income of a household by €80 per week, it may be that a direct 
expenditure of €100 to the household would be required to achieve 
the same impact on disposable income, because the direct transfer 
could increase tax liability. 
To our knowledge, only the “revenue foregone” approach has 
been applied in official analysis of Irish tax expenditures. “Revenue 
foregone” calculations for each of the main allowances/ 
credits/exemptions/reliefs in the system are included in the annual 
Statistical Report of the Revenue Commissioners. This does not correspond 
exactly with the tax expenditure approach (e.g., personal allowances 
or credits are an integral part of the “normal” tax structure, and 
would not be costed as a tax expenditure, but are included in the 
Revenue listing). Nevertheless, the information provided is helpful 
in arriving at an understanding of the nature of tax expenditures in 
Ireland. 
Table 1 reorganises the latest published information provided by 
the Revenue Commissioners (2003) in order to understand the scale 
and nature of current tax expenditures.3 The period reported is the 
last nine months of 2001, the short tax year arising from the 
 
Table 1: Costs (Revenue Foregone) of Tax Reliefs, 2001 
Group of reliefs Cost in 2001 (short tax year) 
 € 
PAYE Allowance 478 
Other personal allowances 237 
Health insurance & expenses 206 
Tax treatment of pensions 1,995 
Mortgage and rent 218 
Savings 246 
Exempt social welfare income 159 
Other exempt income 36 
Profit-sharing, Options, BES etc. 60 
Income adjustments  
(double taxation relief, group relief, employee 
expenses) 677 
Charities 22 
Miscellaneous 11 
Capital Allowances 1,833 
10 per cent Corporation Tax 1,916 
Source: Revenue Commissioners Statistical Report 2003, Table IT6. 
 
3 The detailed table from the Revenue Commissioners report is reproduced in 
Appendix 1. 
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transition from an April-to-April fiscal year to a calendar year. As 
our main focus is on comparisons of cost across items within this 
“year”, no adjustment has been made for the fact that it refers to a 
nine  month period. 
There are, of course, interdependencies between these items 
which mean that the sum of the individual cost estimates is not 
necessarily equal to the total cost. Nevertheless, it is clear that a 
small number of components account for a large share of the total 
cost. As basic personal allowances are part of the structure of the 
normal tax system, we have excluded them from the above table. 
This leaves three items which account for over 70 per cent of the 
sum of the individual cost estimates: 
• Tax treatment of pensions: the counterfactual here is that 
contributions are charged to tax, pension fund income is 
taxed, and then pension payments are taxed as income.4 
• Capital allowances – where the revenue foregone is 
calculated on all capital allowances, and not just those with 
an accelerated element. 
• Corporation tax, where the 10 per cent tax rate for 
manufacturing is contrasted with the higher “standard” rate 
for other industries. 
The issues concerning each of these major components of the 
“revenue foregone” are worthy of detailed investigation, but are not 
the subject of the current paper. (On pensions see Hughes(2001) 
and Hughes and Sinfield (2004)). A key point in relation to 
corporation tax, however, is that the response of firms (both foreign 
and domestic) to changes in the corporation tax is critical. It may be 
more productive to consider this issue in the context of marginal 
changes to the current rate of tax, rather than a context in which the 
implied change in the tax rate is a very large one. There are also 
issues concerning the design of state aids to industry, in the context 
of EU regulation, which are again beyond our remit. These issues 
will continue to be important, even when the unification of the 
corporation tax rate at 12.5 per cent  means that in effect, there will 
be no measured tax expenditure from this source. 
Table 2 below lists reliefs identified by the Revenue 
Commissioners for which costs are either not quantifiable, negligible 
or not identifiable within total aggregates.5 Some of this arises from 
the fact that taxpayers were not required to give details on their 
returns of the particular schemes under which capital allowances 
were claimed (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2002). The 
Comptroller and Auditor General expressed concern about “the lack 
of information available on the cost to the Exchequer of many tax 
expenditure schemes”. The Department of Finance and Revenue 
4 Such a configuration is uncommon internationally, but does operate in New 
Zealand. 
5 This list would be more helpful if it identified for each relief which of these three 
categories was applicable. 
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responses to these concerns point to the competing objective of 
keeping compliance costs low, through simplifications of forms, 
procedures and regulations as a constraint on the gathering of the 
detailed information required for costing of the reliefs. Revenue 
indicate that developments in their On-Line service will help to 
resolve these competing demands; but it is not clear why a form-
based solution cannot also be developed, which places a significant  
burden only on those taxpayers making use of the reliefs. 
Table 2: Reliefs for Which Costs are not Quantifiable, Negligible, or Not Identifiable Within 
Total Aggregates 
Incentives 
Relief for investment in research and development; 
Exemption in respect of income arising from certain patents; 
Exemption in respect of stallion stud fees; 
Exemption of profits arising from commercially managed woodlands; 
Exemption in respect of certain income derived from the leasing of farm land; 
Incentives associated with multi-storey car parks, park and ride, enterprise areas, hotels, holiday cottages, 
nursing and convalescent homes, housing for the elderly or infirm, private hospitals, sports injury clinics, 
buildings used for childcare purposes and various schemes for urban, town and rural renewal *; 
Renewal scheme for traditional seaside resorts; 
Expenditure on certain buildings in designated inner city areas; 
Reliefs for activities related to the Customs House Docks Area and Shannon Airport Customs-Free zone; 
Relief for new shares purchased on issue by employees; 
Relief from averaging of farm profits; 
Relief for various business-related expenses such as staff recruitment, rent, legal fees, and other general 
 expenses; 
Tax privileged savings and investments 
Exemption of income from foreign trusts; 
Reduced tax rate of 10 per cent for authorised unit trust schemes; 
Reduced tax rate of 10 per cent for special investment schemes; 
Exemption in certain circumstances on quoted bearer Eurobonds; 
Relief for investment income reserved for policy holders in life assurance companies; 
Exemption of certain grants made by Údarás na Gaeltachta; 
Exemption of lump-sum retirement payments; 
Exemption of payments made as compensation for loss of office; 
Awards for health/injuries 
Exemption for income arising from payments in respect of personal injuries; 
Exemption of certain payments made by Haemophilia HIV Trust; 
Charitable gifts and donations 
Donations to Third Level Institutions; 
Certain payments to an Irish university, made by a person carrying on a trade or profession;  
Exemption of scholarship income; 
Donations to Public  Libraries; 
Donations made to certain bodies engaged in the promotion of the arts; 
Relief for gifts to The Enterprise Trust Ltd.; 
Relief for donations made to "Cospoir" The National Sports Council; 
Relief for donations made by companies to First Step Ltd.; 
Miscellaneous 
Relief for allowable motor expenses; 
Tapering relief allowable for taxation of car benefits-in-kind; 
Exemption in respect of payments made under the Enterprise Allowance Scheme. 
Notes:  *See estimated cost included for capital allowances under the heading “Income Tax and/or Corporation 
Tax”. 
Source: Revenue Commissioners (2003) Statistical Report of the Revenue Commissioners 2003, p.66. 
 
In examining the cost of tax reliefs, the revenue foregone 
approach mainly used in official statistics is a good starting point, 
but needs to be complemented by analyses which take into account 
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likely behavioural responses to the existence or abolition of the 
relief. Even if the response is such that a particular activity would 
only be located in Ireland with a subsidy or tax relief, this does not 
in itself constitute a firm case for such a subsidy. In the context of 
an economy operating at or near full-employment, one must 
consider the best alternative use of the resources which would be 
employed in the activity. For broader policy issues, such as the rate 
of corporation tax, estimation of the elasticity of response to a small 
change in the rate may be more informative than attempting to 
construct a “counterfactual” with a very different tax rate. 
 
 Who benefits from the various tax expenditures, and to what 
extent? Here, the available information is somewhat limited. Some 
reliefs may be used mainly by a relatively small number of high net 
worth individuals – but confidentiality considerations may limit the 
extent to which this can be analysed or discussed. Other reliefs, such 
as that for health insurance premia and mortgage interest relief are 
widely used by taxpayers. For such reliefs, survey data can capture 
the extent to which they are used by different individuals and 
families, and the SWITCH model can simulate the distribution of 
the “tax expenditure” as measured by revenue foregone. 
4. 
Tax 
Expenditures: 
Who Benefits?
Mortgage interest tax relief is one of the most widely used reliefs. 
It has been “standard-rated” for several years, so that top rate 
taxpayers receive no greater benefit than standard rate taxpayers. 
Furthermore, the introduction of mortgage interest relief at source 
means that, in effect, it operates in the same way as a refundable tax 
credit: even those with no income tax liability see a benefit, as their 
payments to banks or building societies are reduced directly and not 
via an income tax reduction. All of these factors suggest that the 
distributive pattern of the tax expenditure from mortgage interest 
relief will tend to be a good deal more equal than that for many 
other reliefs. 
Table 3 shows the estimated distributive pattern for mortgage 
interest tax relief in 2000, and for the year 2005.6 In the year 2000, 
we estimate that over 90 per cent of the benefit from mortgage 
income tax relief accrued to the top four deciles of the income 
distribution. The introduction of mortgage interest relief at source in 
2002 meant that individuals and families without a tax liability, who 
previously gained no benefit from the scheme, now gained directly 
from a reduction in their mortgage repayments. This was a key 
factor in raising the share of the benefit accruing to the bottom half 
of the distribution from less than 10 per cent to close to 20 per cent. 
Nevertheless, even with this modification, the mortgage interest tax 
relief accrues predominantly to the top half of the distribution, with 
6 The Living in Ireland Survey 2000 provides the initial database for the SWITCH 
model. The database for the year 2005 has been uprated and adjusted to take into 
account key developments over that time. 
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the top one-fifth of households accounting for close to half of the 
tax foregone. 
Table 3: Distribution of Tax Foregone from Mortgage Interest Relief 
Classified by Deciles of Income Per Adult Equivalent 
Decile 2000 2005 
 % % 
Bottom 0 0.8 
2nd 0 0.6 
3rd 0 1.6 
4th 1.9 5.9 
5th 6.5 9.6 
6th 7.9 11.6 
7th 12.6 10.3 
8th 15.2 13.6 
9th 21.0 20.0 
Top 35.0 26.0 
   
All 100.0 100.0 
 
Thus, even one of the commonest and most widely used forms 
of tax relief, that for mortgage interest, involves a distributive 
pattern which is strongly skewed towards the upper reaches of the 
income distribution. 
 
 
5.1  ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX (AMT) IN THE US 5. 
A Minimum 
Tax?
Recent reports on the tax paid by high earners, such as the Revenue 
Commissioners (2005) study,  which showed that 29 of Ireland’s top 
400 earners paid no tax. Property-based reliefs were identified in the 
report as a major factor contributing to this situation.  As noted 
earlier, this has led to a review of the operation of property-based 
reliefs. Included in its remit is the possibility of a “minimum tax” 
designed to ensure a greater tax contribution from high earners. 
Similarly in the USA in the late 1960s, anger sparked by the 
Treasury Secretary’s testimony that 155 high-income households had 
paid no income tax in 1966 led to the imposition of a minimum tax 
that first took effect in 1970. That minimum tax was intended to 
increase tax payments from taxpayers who, under the rules of the 
regular tax system, were believed to pay too little tax relative to a 
more standard measure of their income. The individual Alternative 
Minimum Tax (AMT) that is still in place today evolved from that 
tax. 
Before considering the US experience with a minimum tax, it 
should be noted that policy in this area may have two quite distinct 
objectives: 
• Objective 1: individual equity/perceived fairness of the 
system. 
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• Objective 2: control of amounts of tax expenditures. 
The weight attached to these two objectives is a matter for 
policymakers. But it should be noted that pursuing either objective 
on its own does not guarantee any improvement in terms of the 
other objective. For example, limiting the individual gain from tax 
reliefs so that high-income taxpayers must pay some income tax 
leaves open the possibility that the total cost of the tax relief will be 
just as great, with the relief simply spread over a larger number of 
people. On the other hand, limiting the total relief by eliminating 
certain reliefs and reducing others may help to attain objective 2, but 
could still leave some high income taxpayers paying little or no tax. 
5.2  HOW THE US ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX (AMT) 
WORKS 
The individual7 Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) was originally 
intended to ensure that high-income people could not use reliefs to 
shelter all their income from tax. The AMT operates parallel to the 
regular income tax, with a different income definition, rate structure, 
and allowable deductions, exemptions and credits. In essence, it is an 
alternative tax structure which has fewer deductions, but a higher 
exemption limit and higher rates than the ordinary system. 
Taxpayers who may be subject to the AMT must make two 
calculations of tax liability: once under the regular income tax rules 
and again under AMT. If AMT liability proves higher, taxpayers pay 
the difference as a surcharge on their regular income tax. The total 
tax paid can then be partitioned into two parts: that arising under the 
ordinary tax system, and the additional part which arises from the 
minimum tax calculated under AMT rules. 
The regular income tax rules allow taxpayers to claim certain 
exemptions, deductions, exclusions and credits. These include 
personal exemptions, the standard deduction, and itemised 
deductions for state taxes and miscellaneous expenses. These fall 
into the ‘exemption preference’ category and are most likely to affect 
middle-income taxpayers. These are not allowed in the AMT, even 
though they have little to do with tax sheltering. The second 
category are ‘deferral preferences’ which allow taxpayers to postpone 
regular income tax payments or shelter income by hastening 
deductions or delaying income recognition. The AMT limits the 
extent to which taxpayers can use deferrals by, for example, allowing 
less generous depreciation deductions. Compared with exemption 
preferences, deferral preferences are more consistent with the 
original goals of the AMT, have a greater tendency to affect high-
income individuals, but are more complex and generate less revenue 
(Burman, Gale and Rohaly, 2003). 
To determine the amount owed in AMT, if any, the taxpayer 
must compute their alternative minimum taxable income (AMTI). 
This generally requires taxpayers to give up the benefit of tax 
7 The US federal income tax also has a corporate AMT. 
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preference items to which they are entitled under the regular tax 
system, as outlined above. The next step is to subtract the AMT 
exemption. The AMT exemption amounts, which are higher than 
the equivalent deductions under the regular tax, are temporarily 
boosted to $58,000 for married taxpayers and $40,250 for most 
other taxpayers. After 2005 these exemption amounts are scheduled 
to drop back to $45,000 and $33,750 respectively. After subtracting 
the exemption, the first $175,000 of remaining income is taxed at a 
statutory 26 per cent rate, with additional income taxed at a 28 per 
cent rate.8 So, although the exemption amounts are higher under the 
AMT than under the regular tax, the initial tax rate under AMT is 
higher than in the ordinary system.  
The AMT succeeds in the objective of reducing the number of 
high-income filers who pay no income tax. Burman, Gale and 
Rohaly (2003) estimated that 600 tax filers with incomes exceeding 
$1 million avoided all income tax in 2003. In the absence of AMT 
the number avoiding all tax would have been 2,700.  
So what are the problems with the AMT? Given the very nature 
of the AMT as outlined above (i.e. that it operates in parallel with 
the regular tax code and effectively requires many taxpayers to 
prepare two tax returns) the AMT is widely denounced for adding to 
the complexity of the tax code. It is criticised as confusing and 
leading to taxpayer uncertainty about applicable marginal tax rates 
and tax incentives.  
Another main fault with the AMT is that, unlike the regular tax 
rules, the rate brackets and the AMT exemption are not indexed for 
inflation. This has serious impacts on the numbers paying the tax 
and the amount paid. Burman, Gale and Rohaly (2003) project that 
by 2010 the AMT will affect 33 million taxpayers, about one-third of 
all taxpayers. This would be up from 1 million in 1999, making it the 
de facto tax system for 92 per cent of households with income 
between $100,000 and $500,000. Such an expansion of the AMT 
would mean that it applied to far more taxpayers than was originally 
envisaged. On these projections, by 2008 it would cost less to repeal 
the regular tax than to repeal the AMT.  
Other problems with the AMT include the fact that it raises 
marginal tax rates, it penalises taxpayers who marry because it 
prohibits deductions for dependents and it is poorly targeted 
because it takes away provisions that have nothing to do with tax 
sheltering. 
5.3  LESSONS FOR IRELAND? 
Given the many problems with and criticisms of the AMT, the 
approach taken in the US does not seem to be the best remedy to 
the problem of some high-earners paying little tax. Some of the 
difficulties could be avoided by a simpler version of an AMT. But if 
8 The AMT exemption is phased out at higher incomes. As it is phased out, 
effective tax rates can be as high as 35 per cent, dropping back to 28 per cent at 
even higher income levels, when the exemption has been fully phased out. 
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there is a political imperative to ensure that high income taxpayers 
pay some tax this might also be addressed by limits on the extent of 
benefit from any one relief, or from the set of reliefs. Rather than 
impose a minimum tax on income, this approach would work by 
limiting the value of reliefs. The limitation could be in terms of the 
aggregate value of the relief (an approach already in place, for 
example, in the BES scheme) and/or a limitation in terms of the 
proportion of a taxpayer’s income sheltered by a relief or the set of 
such reliefs. An advantage of this approach is that it would tend to 
place any increased administrative burden on the shoulders of 
taxpayers availing from such reliefs, in contrast with the US 
Alternative Minimum Tax experience, which adds complexity and 
uncertainty to the tax affairs of middle income earners. 
 
 There is a need for a more systematic regular review of tax reliefs 
than has taken place heretofore. Reviews of this type form part of 
international “best practice” on tax expenditures. (See, for example, 
Swift 2004.) The US, Germany, France, Belgium and Austria are 
among those countries in which the government is legally obliged to 
produce a report on tax expenditures. In some other countries (e.g., 
Canada and the Netherlands) there is no statutory obligation, but the 
government has produced a tax expenditure report. 
6. 
 Conclusions
Given the difficulties which exist in removing a relief once in 
place, it is particularly important that proposals for tax expenditures 
receive a thorough and searching examination, matching that which 
faces expenditure proposals. Particular attention must also be given 
to alternative ways of achieving the objective of a tax expenditure: 
the transparency of direct expenditure should usually mean that it is 
favoured over tax expenditures. 
The objective of ensuring some minimum payment from high 
income taxpayers can be attained with less impact on ordinary 
taxpayers by restrictions on the reliefs, rather than the introduction 
of a US-style minimum tax. 
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Appendix 1: Cost (revenue foregone) of income tax and corporation tax reliefs for 6 April to 
31 December 2001 (short tax year 2001) 
 €m 
Basic Personal Allowances  
Married Person's Allowance 1,181.4 
Single Person's Allowance 897.7 
Exemption Limits  
General Exemption  0.0 
Child Addition  0.4 
Age Exemption 6.5 
Additional Personal Allowances  
Widowed Person's Allowance 71.1 
Additional Allowance to Widowed Person in Year of Bereavement  4.2 
Additional Bereavement Allowance to Widowed Parent  3.9 
Additional Personal Allowance for Lone Parent  78.9 
Homecarer Credit  57.9 
Additional Allowance for Incapacitated Child  2.7 
Employee (PAYE) Allowance  478.4 
Dependent Relative Allowance  0.8 
Person Taking Care of Incapacitated Taxpayer  0.4 
Age Allowance 16.9 
Blind Person's Allowance 0.5 
Health Insurance and Expenses  
Medical Insurance Premia 168.0 
Health Expenses Relief  36.0 
Permanent Health Benefit schemes 1.5 
Tax Treatment of Pensions  
Employees' Contributions To Approved Superannuation Schemes  388.7 
Employers' Contributions To Approved Superannuation Schemes 497.7 
Exemption of Net Income of Approved Superannuation Funds (Contributions Plus Investment 
 Income Less Outgoings  
 
938.4 
Retirement Annuity Premiums 170.0 
Mortgage interest and rent reliefs  
Loans relating to Principal Private Residence 169.3 
Other interest  11.0 
Rent Paid in Private Tenancies  17.9 
Rented Residential Accommodation  19.8 
Income Adjustments  
Expenses Allowable to Employees Under Schedule E  54.0 
Dispositions (Including Maintenance Payments made to Separated Spouses) 10.2 
Allowance for seafarers  0.2 
Double Taxation Relief  323.7 
Group Relief  289.1 
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Appendix 1: Contd. 
€m 
Savings  
Exemption of Interest on Savings Certificates, National Instalment Savings & Index 
 Linked Savings Bonds  
 
87.8 
Special Savings Incentive Scheme 71.0 
Exemption of Irish Government Securities Where Owner Not Ordinarily Resident in 
 Ireland 
 
87.3 
Treatment of Charities  
Exemption of Income of Charities, Colleges, Hospitals, Schools, Friendly societies, etc. (6)  8.3 
Donations to Approved Bodies 13.3 
Tax Relief for Designated Third World Charities  -  
Allowance for School Donations  0.0 
Exempt Income  
Exemption of Certain Earnings of Writers, Composers and Artists  23.5 
Exemption of Statutory Redundancy Payments  8.7 
Top Slicing Relief - Reduced Tax Rate for Payments in Excess of Exemption Amounts Made 
 as Compensation for Loss of Office  
 
3.8 
Child benefit 153.4 
Maternity allowance  5.5 
Exemption of Pensions, Benefits or Gratuities Payable to Veterans of the War of 
 Independence, their Widows or Dependents 
 
0.1 
Profit-sharing, Share options, BES  
Relief Under Profit Sharing Schemes 30.6 
Exemption Under Approved Share Option Schemes  0.2 
Investment in Corporate Trades (BES) 15.1 
Investment in Seed Capital  1.2 
Stock Relief 1.4 
Section 84 loans (12)  0.2 
Investment in Films  11.3 
Miscellaneous  
Relief for expenditure on significant buildings and gardens  0.4 
Donation of Heritage items  2.0 
Service Charges 2.4 
Third Level Education Fees  4.5 
Revenue Job Assist allowance 1.7 
Capital Allowances:  
Urban Renewal  19.5 
Other  1,813.9 
Effective Rate of 10 Per Cent for Manufacturing and Certain Other Activities  1,916.4 
Source: Revenue Commissioners (2003) Statistical Report, Table IT6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WASTE COLLECTION, 
DOUBLE TAXATION 
AND LOCAL FINANCE  
Edgar Morgenroth 
 Over recent years a vocal lobby has been campaigning against 
what they call the ‘bin tax’. Their argument is that this is a form of 
double taxation and as such is not fair and should be scrapped. 
Indeed they claim that this is another ‘stealth tax’, which has 
increased the tax burden while not improving services. Instead, 
waste collection services should be funded out of general taxation. 
On the other hand, there has been a move towards a more market-
orientated system of waste collection with local authorities 
outsourcing the service or fully privatising it to licensed operators. 
These developments have also led to changes in the nature of the 
charges towards weights or volume base charges. This means that in 
contrast to general taxation or flat charges householders are now 
able to reduce their waste charges through more environmentally 
friendly behaviour.  
1. 
Introduction
Changes in the way waste collection services are operated and 
charged for have been driven by a number of factors. First, with the 
increase in the population and incomes, waste generation has 
increased substantially. Second, EU directives have forced higher 
standards on landfill site, which necessarily imply higher costs. 
Finally, local authorities have been obliged under the Waste 
Management Act, 1996 to make provision for the collection of 
household waste, a function which they previously carried out only 
partially in that public household waste collection service was not 
available in many rural areas. Now local authorities are automatically 
licensed to carry out the waste collection, or in conjunction with the 
Environmental Protection Agency, issue licences to private 
operators to carry out the service. 
While waste charges have been proposed by a number of studies 
that were concerned with methods of implementing the polluter 
pays principle (e.g., Barrett, Lawlor and Scott, 1997) or in research 
that dealt with the workings of the solid waste market (e.g., Barrett 
and Lawlor, 1995), the more general public choice issues and their 
relationship to local authority financing has not been analysed in the 
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Irish context. This paper addresses these issues by first considering 
the impact of different financing systems on efficiency and cost 
effectiveness of the provision of waste collection services. This 
involves analysing the objectives of the local authorities and 
householders.  
On the local authority side a number of different theories have 
been put forward that suggests that these, as well as central 
government, have an inherent tendency to be inefficient either in 
cost terms or in terms of the quantity of goods and services 
supplied. The question then is whether waste collection charges 
could help in making local government more efficient and thereby 
reduce local budgets or improve services. Similarly, if the correct 
incentives are not available, then households will consume more or 
less of a good or service than optimal. In the case of household 
waste, they might not attempt to reduce the amount of waste that is 
produced and recycle less.  
Since there has been a move towards a more market-based 
system of waste collection it is also important to consider whether 
the public sector should be involved in this activity at all, and this is 
considered using the basic concepts of public economics. This paper 
questions the role for government involvement in providing the 
service, by considering the public goods qualities of the waste 
collection service. In general it is not clear why governments should 
provide a private good or service even if a market failure exists since, 
as Coase (1960) has shown, this can be internalised through the 
market. 
Apart from these theoretical considerations it is also important to 
analyse the trends in terms of local authority finance of waste 
collection. This is particularly interesting since Irish local authorities 
have very limited revenue raising powers that are confined to 
commercial rates, charging for goods and services, development 
levies and rent, with the bulk of funding coming in grants from 
central government.1 In principle the introduction of a charge 
should reduce general taxation, but since general taxation is raised by 
central government and not by local government this need not be 
the case. Thus, a more important question is the degree to which 
local authority revenues have changed. In this respect it is useful to 
assess the level of revenue generated through charges as well as any 
change in funding of local government from central funds. 
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we consider the 
case for the public provision of waste collection services. In Section 
3 the efficiency of public provision is analysed, while in Section 4 the 
private incentives to reduce waste are outlined. Section 5 aims to 
identify the local government finance implications of the 
introduction of waste collection charges and Section 6 summarises 
the main findings and draws some conclusions. 
1 While vehicle taxes are also retained for local authority funding, these are part of 
the Local Government Fund and County Councils do not have the power to alter 
the rates at which these taxes are levied. 
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To start with it is useful to consider whether waste collection 
services should be publicly provided at all. We base our analysis on 
the public economics literature. Here we focus particularly on the 
relevant function of government namely the provision of public 
goods2 and consider whether waste collection is a public good. 
 
2. 
Should Waste 
Collection be 
Publicly 
Provided? It is the allocation function that is of relevance for the purposes 
of this paper. In particular it is important to consider whether waste 
collection is a public good, since the rationale for public provision is 
more compelling for public goods. A public good is a good or 
service, which if supplied to one person is still available to another 
person. This implies that a public good is non-rival in consumption 
and non-excludable (see Cornes and Sandler, 1996). If one considers 
waste collection against these criteria it is clear that this is not a pure 
public good since it is straightforward to exclude individuals from 
the service, as has been the case for those that have not paid their 
waste collection charges. Furthermore, it is not a truly non-rival 
service in the sense that householders are not consuming the same 
unit of service (i.e., different bins are collected), even though the 
consumption of the service does not necessarily detract from the 
benefits derived by others from the service.  
However, waste collection is intrinsically desirable as for example 
there are public health reasons why waste should be collected and 
not be allowed to accumulate. The unsystematic disposal of waste by 
individuals could result in pollution and thus have externalities. This 
does not only apply to illegal dumping but also to the burning of 
refuse as this releases a high level of toxins such as dioxins. Thus, it 
is the irresponsible actions of individuals in the absence of waste 
collection that are generating an externality not the waste collection 
service itself. This suggests that it is more appropriate to consider 
waste collection a merit good – one that is seen by the majority to be 
beneficial to society and one that should be consumed by everyone.  
If consumers are not willing to purchase the merit good then 
they should be compelled or encouraged to do so. The rationale for 
this arises out of the impact that the failure of purchasing waste 
collection service could have since the domestic waste that is 
produced has to be discarded in some way. Of course individuals 
could do this in a responsible manner by bringing it to a landfill site 
or incinerator or by increased recycling and waste reduction. On the 
other hand the waste could be disposed of in a way that has a 
negative impact on the environment and therefore generates a 
negative externality for the general public.  
2 Musgrave (1959), identified stabilisation, allocation and redistribution as the 
functions of government. The first function simply refers to the fact that economies 
are subject to cycles and thus are unlikely to have stable and high levels of output, 
employment and stable prices at all time. The allocation function refers to the 
likelihood that due to positive externalities, the market is unlikely to allocate 
sufficient public goods so that these would be undersupplied. Finally, the 
redistribution function refers to the possibility that without government there was 
unlikely to be an equitable distribution of income and resources. 
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This suggests that waste collection need not be publicly provided. 
Of course the private sector will only carry out such a service if they 
are able to make profits out of running the service. This implies that 
the private sector either charges the public sector or householders 
directly. In the latter case it is particularly important an effective 
disincentive to littering is in place, since as argued above, the 
incentives are to litter and thereby generate negative externalities.  
Dobbs (1991) highlights the link between charges for waste 
collection and littering. He argues that user charges on their own will 
not yield a welfare maximising outcome and he thus argues that a 
cost to littering is best introduced as a subsidy (negative user charge) 
that should be imposed in conjunction with user charges. While this 
is welfare maximising in a theoretical model, in practice such a 
scheme is only feasible in certain circumstance, mainly confined to 
recyclables such as refundable deposits for bottles, which have been 
successfully used in many countries.  
Having established that waste collection does not need to be 
publicly provided it is clear that charging for such a service cannot 
be considered taxation. Rather it is the price charged for a specific 
service. Of course this service was previously heavily subsidised or 
even fully subsidised. Furthermore, even if one were to consider 
waste collection charges a tax, one cannot consider them a form of 
double taxation, since tax relief is available for service charges 
including waste collection charges.3 
 
While the arguments above are simply based on the nature of the 
service supplied, it is also important to consider whether public 
provision would be efficient. In this section we consider the various 
theoretical approaches in the public choice literature that are 
relevant for the analysis of waste charges. In particular we focus on 
factors that determine the efficiency/inefficiency of the provision of 
public services, which is summarised in Bierhanzl and Downing 
(1998).  
 
3. 
Inefficiency in 
Public Provision 
of Services
Traditionally the public provision of services has also implied 
that these are provided by a public monopoly. As is well known, 
monopoly provision is not efficient in the sense that prices will be 
higher due to the market power that is exercised by the monopoly. 
This result assumes that monopolies aim to maximise profits. 
However, since bureaucrats, who do not maximise profits, run the 
public sector the conventional monopoly theory is not relevant. 
Rather, it is necessary to consider alternative aims, which might lead 
to an inefficient outcome. 
 
3 Water charges and sewerage disposal are also subject to tax relief. Tax relief for 
service charges has been available since 1996/97, having been introduced in the 
1995 Finance Act. In fact the tax relief granted is not available on arrears and thus 
incorporates an incentive to pay on time. 
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One type of theory that has been put forward is referred to as 
bureaucracy theory (see Niskanen, 1971). In contrast to standard 
monopoly theory, bureaucracy theory suggests that bureaucrats aim 
to maximise their budgets or other variables that determine their 
power such as the number of staff or the size of their budgets. This 
can result in competition among bureaucrats for larger budgets and 
larger departments. However, if only one agency has a remit to 
provide a particular service then competition is limited. If the 
demand for the service is relatively unresponsive to changes in the 
price of that service then it is possible to extract a significantly 
higher expenditure by raising the price. This higher price is achieved 
through lower efficiency, which is only feasible if there is no 
competition and if it is difficult to identify this inefficiency 
(ambiguous technology). It is important to note that the pricing 
mechanism that generates this outcome is one where all the 
information is held by the service provider and budgeting takes place 
in advance of the provision of the service. Bureaucracy theory is 
particularly appropriate where an agency produces multiple outputs, 
which implies that it is even more difficult for customers to know 
the true cost of the service and to be able to relate the cost to the 
quality and quantity of the service provided. Of course, if the cost of 
the service is made explicit by charging for each service separately, 
inefficiencies are easier to identify. 
A second theory, namely agenda theory can also be applied to the 
issue and this again shows that an inefficient outcome is likely. The 
fundamental aspect of this theory is that budgets are voted on and 
the voting mechanism can be ‘hijacked’ by agenda setters. Agenda 
setters will seek to control the alternatives that are being voted on. 
In particular they will seek to offer a range of alternatives that are 
substantially off the median voters’ reservation level. In such a 
scenario the least unfavourable alternative will be chosen. Again the 
level of information is important since if agenda setters have better 
information than the other representatives then the likelihood of 
their being successful is increased. As before the mechanism by 
which the service is funded is crucial to the inefficient outcome 
coming about, since explicit charges yield contain information about 
the degree of inefficiency. Once agenda setters have gained control 
of the agenda, we have a situation of regulatory capture, which 
suggests that those charged with bringing in new schemes and 
legislation will have little incentive to do so (see Helm (2001) for 
examples). 
Another explanation for inefficiency in the public sector is to do 
with the incentives that are available to bureaucrats, since their pay is 
not generally related to performance4 (see Dixit (2002) for a review 
of the theoretical literature). Thus, there is little incentive to operate 
4 Of course one can argue that in the Irish context benchmarking has introduced 
some degree of performance related pay increases, but importantly, the wage 
increases were applied across whole organisation (e.g. Government departments) 
rather than to individual efficient civil servants. 
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at an efficient level, and even less to improve efficiency. Again, the 
pricing mechanism is important since the inefficiency is less 
apparent when the service is not directly paid for. 
In the literature the usual approach is to set the price that is to be 
charged directly equal to the long-run marginal cost of providing the 
service. This turns out to be an efficient user charge since it sets an 
incentive to householders not to over consume the service while on 
the other hand forcing bureaucrats away from inefficient allocations 
by forcing them off their inefficient price, or because control of the 
agenda is lost as actual costs are being made public.  
3.1 EFFICIENCY EFFECTS 
Whatever the source of inefficiency, an appropriate pricing scheme 
and competition are expected to decrease the inefficiencies. In 
particular a funding scheme that relies on accurate cost information 
will yield a more efficient outcome since this will provide all actors 
with the information to make the right decisions.  
In relation to efficiency in waste collection, a number of studies 
have been published. For example, Cubbin et al. (1987) estimate 
Farrell efficiency measures for refuse collection in England and 
Wales. They found that the technical efficiency for contracted out 
refuse collection was 17 per cent higher than that for non-tendered 
local authority collection and that this accounted for the bulk of the 
cost savings which amounted to 22 per cent. If agency theory is at 
work then one would expect budgets to be higher and indeed, 
Bierhanzl and Downing (1998) show empirically that local 
authorities that rely more on user charges have lower budgets. This 
suggests that the transparency provided by user charges limits the 
degree of inefficiency in terms of the size of the budgets. 
In the Irish context the organisation of household waste 
collection in Ireland has been subject to some changes and some 
local authorities have outsourced or even privatised this service. The 
effect this has had on efficiency has been investigated by Reeves and 
Barrow (2000). Their data which was collected through a number of 
surveys in 1996 was used in regression analysis. In this analysis costs 
are related to a range of authority specific variables such as the 
density of units from which waste was collected and the nature of 
the service provided i.e., contracted out. The analysis showed that 
there was a 45 per cent cost saving for contracting out the service so 
that the efficiency gains are very substantial.  
 
The previous two examples have highlighted the role of the public 
sector provider in achieving an inefficient outcome. However, 
consumers can also be responsible for an inefficient outcome. If 
there is no link between the quantity of a good or service that is 
consumed and the payment for that good or service then the 
consumers have no incentive to keep the level of consumption to an 
efficient level (Besley, 1991).  
 
4. 
Inefficiency in 
Consumption
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In the case of waste collection consumers are likely to generate 
more waste and require more collections than would otherwise be 
the case, and they are unlikely to recycle waste. This is exaggerated if 
householders suffer from fiscal illusion, that is they systematically 
underestimate their tax burden, so that the consequences of this 
over-consumption are even less apparent. Fiscal illusion can arise if 
the actual tax payments are either very fragmented into lots of 
different taxes so that none is very large or if taxes are paid on a 
monthly or weekly basis so that no one payment is very large. Again 
the funding mechanism is crucial to the inefficiency result. Here in 
particular a funding mechanism that properly charges at the margin 
for the service that is provided is needed to overcome the 
inefficiency, since in the case of a flat charge for the service say €300 
a year the marginal cost to the householder of creating more waste is 
zero. In other words, once the householder has paid his fee he has 
no incentive to reduce the weight or volume of the waste created – 
putting out an extra amount of waste will not cost him more. 
User charges also have distributional consequences if they are 
implemented instead of a general taxation financed system since in 
the latter only those that actually pay taxes pay for the service while 
in the former all households pay unless there is some kind of waiver 
scheme. The absence of such a waiver scheme would undoubtedly 
result in some resistance to the introduction of a user charge system 
since it would negatively impact on the poor. However, a simple 
waiver implies that no incentive is available to the poor to reduce 
their level of waste. An alternative would be to increase their income 
(pensions, social welfare, etc.) by an amount that would pay for the 
socially optimum level of waste collection (see Balestrino (1999) for 
a similar argument). Distributional aspects are also considered from 
a more practical point of view in Scott and Eakins (2001) who also 
advise against a waiver scheme and in favour of increased rates of 
social welfare, pensions and family income supplement. With regard 
to the latter it is well known that the take up is low but this is not an 
argument against using this instrument in order to ensure efficiency 
rather it is an argument for the better implementation of that 
scheme. 
4.1 BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSES 
The introduction of taxes or charges should have an impact on the 
behaviour of individuals that are subject to these charges. In the 
Irish context this has already been shown in the case of the plastic 
bag tax, which has drastically reduced the usage of plastic bags. 
Thus, it is also interesting to consider the degree to which the waste 
collection charges have had an impact on behaviour. Charging, and 
especially volume or weights based charging should result in the 
reduction of waste created. This reduction can be due to increased 
recycling or less production of overall waste. 
Two approaches can be used to assess the behavioural response. 
On the one hand one can collect data at the household level, which 
allows for a more thorough analysis. Thus, data on various 
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household characteristics can be collected which can be used to 
identify which households are more responsive. The second 
approach uses aggregate published data to identify any possible 
changes in waste creation trends. 
At this point no completed micro-level analysis is available for 
Ireland but, preliminary results from ongoing research also show a 
substantial reduction of waste collected. However, evidence for 
other countries is available.5 Fullerton and Kinnemann (1996) 
investigated the impact of charging per bag in US municipalities in 
the early 1990s. They found that following the introduction of 
volume based charging the weight of waste collected per household 
decreased by 14 per cent and the volume decreased by 37 per cent, 
while the weight of recyclebales collected increased by 16 per cent. 
They also found that illegal dumping increased. Of course, since the 
charging was on a per volume basis the greatest impact was on the 
volume rather than the weight, so that householders compressed 
their waste to fit more into a bag. An analysis for a municipality in 
southwestern Sweden (Sterner and Bartelings, 1999), which 
introduced a weights-based charging system shows a reduction in 
weight of 29 per cent due to the introduction of the charging system. 
A more recent paper on the impact of weights based charging in the 
Netherlands was published by Linderhof et al. (2001). They show 
that in the first year after the introduction of a weights-based 
charging system total waste presented for collection was down by 56 
per cent after three years with a particularly big reduction in the 
presentation of recyclable waste by 42 per cent. They also found that 
an effective monitoring and fining system has kept illegal dumping 
small.  In summary this research shows that weights and volume 
based charging has a significant effect on the amount of waste 
collected. But the introduction of such a system may also result in 
increased illegal dumping, littering and burning of waste. 
While there is no published micro-evidence on the impact of 
charges on Irish householders, aggregate data is available from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).   Figure 1 shows that 
household waste collected has continued over the period 1998 to 
2002, but that there was a slight decline from 2002 to 2003. Thus, 
there has been no dramatic reduction of overall waste creation even 
though charges have increased. However, this is not inconsistent 
with the literature since weights- and volume-based charging was 
only introduced recently so that the right incentives have so far not 
been available. Furthermore, there has been a very substantial 
increase in the amount of waste that is being recycled so that the 
proportion of recycled waste has grown from 3 per cent in 1998 to 
13 per cent in 2003. This is of course also a behavioural response.   
 
 
 
 
5 See Linderhof et al., for a summary of the results of numerous studies. 
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  Figure 1: Household Waste by Waste Stream 
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Source: EPA Waste Database various years. Note that the figure here relates to the disposal and recovery data 
provided by the EPA rather than the total waste arising.  
 
 Having considered the theoretical rationale for user charges, 
which favours the implementation of weights- or volume-based 
charges for waste collection we turn to the issue of local authority 
finance. Clearly, the changes in the waste collection regime have 
implications for local finance. First, introduction of charges mean 
that cost recovery should be higher in local authorities, and that 
these will require a lower level of resources from central funds. This 
in turn should be reflected in lower general taxation all things being 
equal. Second, as the waste collection service is increasingly being 
provided by the private sector, local authorities are loosing this 
source of revenue. It is, therefore, useful to consider what has 
happened to local authority finance. 
5. 
The Local 
Government 
Finance 
Background
Local Government finance has been a topic that has been 
discussed periodically at least since the mid-1970s when residential 
rates were removed, and central government paid the rates (e.g., 
NESC, 1985; Foundation for Fiscal Studies, 1990; Ridge, 1992). 
While residential rates have not been replaced as a source of direct 
local authority finance, as of 1997 the rates support grant, domestic 
water and sewerage charges have been replaced by the General fund, 
which was replaced by the Local Government Fund in 1999. Until 
1983 a cap was in place that restricted the rate of increase of the 
fund. Furthermore, greater powers to charge for services were given 
to local authorities. But in practice central government began to 
reduce the rates support grant. 
Overall, as Figure 2 shows, real total local government receipts 
(Current and Capital) increasing slightly over the first half of the 
1980s, then declining strongly in the late 1980s and then rising at an 
accelerating pace until 2002. The graph also shows that the bulk of 
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expenditure is on the current side with the capital side never 
exceeding 27 per cent of total receipts. Overall, the local current 
expenditure accounted for 36.4 per cent of government current 
expenditure in 1980 but this declined to less than 27 per cent in 
1990. More recently the local government proportion of current 
government expenditure has risen again to reach 34 per cent in 
2002.  
Figure 2: Real Receipts by Local Government (Deflated by Public Authorities’ Current 
Expenditure Deflator) 
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Source: CSO National Income and Expenditure, various issues.  
 
While receipts have increased strongly over recent years, this 
might be completely unrelated to the charging for services. 
Considering the different revenue streams of local authorities can 
partly identify the importance of revenue from service charges. 
Specifically, miscellaneous current receipts are significantly made up 
of income from the provision of goods and service including waste 
collection charges.   Figure 3 shows the importance of the different 
revenue streams. Most noticeable is the very high importance of 
grants from central government, which on average was 76 per cent 
of total current revenue. Interestingly, this share has been increasing 
over recent years so that the dependence of local authorities on 
central government is increasing. Thus, rather than becoming less 
dependent on central government, through charges for services 
provided, local authorities are actually becoming more dependent on 
central government. The miscellaneous category, which includes 
receipts from the provision of goods and services, increased in 
importance over the 1980s but has been declining over the 1990s. 
This might suggest that in fact the privatisation of services is 
reducing the importance of independent revenue streams for local 
authorities.  
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  Figure 3: Sources of Local Authority Current Revenue (% of Total Current Revenue) 
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Considering the specific revenues and expenditures on waste 
disposal by local authorities, one finds that first, those have 
increased strongly in real terms. These cost increases are largely due 
to the cost of operating landfill infrastructure, which has increased 
due to higher environmental and management standards as a result 
of the introduction of EU directives. Second, the rate of cost 
recovery is increasing, although, on average only 62 per cent of 
expenditure is met by revenues in this area so that local authorities 
continue to subsidise waste disposal services. 
The brief analysis of the local finance implications of the changes 
in the waste collection service show that while cost recovery is 
increasing, the dependence of local authorities on central 
government is also increasing. Thus, the introduction of waste 
collection charges does not seem to have made the local authorities 
more financially independent. 
 
 
 This paper has shown that there are no strong reasons to provide 
a waste collection system through the public sector. Rather, than 
being a pure public good, waste collection is a merit good, the 
consumption of which should be encouraged. Thus, the charging for 
the public provision of this private good cannot be considered 
taxation and given the fact that tax relief is available for these 
charges it is wrong to consider waste collection charges a form of 
double taxation. 
6. 
Conclusions
The private provision of the service is also supported by the 
literature on inefficiencies in the public sector. The inefficiency of 
the public sector can easily be hidden if the cost of a service is not 
immediately apparent. Thus, waste charges can yield more efficient 
services since they imply greater transparency. Substantial evidence 
exists that shows the efficiency benefits of contracting out waste 
collection services. For Ireland, Reeves and Barrow (2000) have 
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shown that the outsourcing and privatisation of waste collection 
service in Ireland has resulted in efficiency gains. 
The public choice literature is very strongly supportive of user 
charges rather than general taxation as a funding mechanism for 
waste collection services. The literature highlights the importance of 
charging on a per-use basis rather than using flat rate charging. A flat 
rate leaves the marginal cost, that is the cost of an additional 
amount, of waste equal to zero so that there is no incentive for 
householders to reduce waste creation and increase recycling. 
Regarding the latter, the literature suggest that rather than charging 
for recycling services, these should be subsidised so as to create the 
right incentive structure. 
From the average householders’ point of view, user charges are 
clearly beneficial as this allows them to reduce their tax burden 
through the appropriate behaviour, assuming that general taxation is 
reduced accordingly. In the Irish context this means that while 
charges are introduced locally, central government has to reduce 
general taxation since local authorities have no general taxation 
powers. This, however, highlights the disconnect between the local 
charges and central taxation which could result in these benefits not 
being passed on to householders. The evidence available here shows 
that charges for goods and services are declining in importance as a 
source of local revenue relative to grants from central government. 
However, the per-capita charges for waste disposal have increased 
substantially over recent years even though these still do not meet 
the cost to local authorities to provide waste disposal services, which 
of course are increasingly limited to the operation of landfill sites. 
Given the strong arguments in favour of waste collection charges 
and in particular for weights-based charging, it is surprising that 
there remains strong opposition to these among a small group. 
While this opposition might be purely on ideological grounds some 
studies have also considered other reasons. For example Hall, 
Emmerson and Brook (1998) investigated the attitudes to local taxes 
and local spending using data collected as part of the British Social 
Attitudes (BSA) survey. They found that there is little demand for 
additional taxing powers at the local level, but that householders 
preferred local authorities to be making the final spending decisions. 
This suggests that fiscal illusion might be a factor in the opposition 
to the charges. For Ireland evidence is presented by Scott and 
Eakins (2001). They show that the vast majority of individuals would 
prefer to pay for waste collection, with the more recent survey 
results showing that of those the majority would like to be charged 
by the amount. 
While our focus here has been on waste collection, similar 
arguments apply to other use charges such as water charges, 
wastewater charges and congestion charges. Overall, given a choice 
between general taxation to fund a service, where no account is 
taken of the level of usage by the individual or household, and a use 
charge where the level is related to usage and can thus be reduced 
through behaviour, the latter is preferable both at the individual and 
societal level. 
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